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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the factors associated with retention to the 0-5 promotion 
point and selection for promotion to 0-5. In particular, this thesis focuses on the 
economic returns to graduate education and specifically Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) education. In theory, the payoff to the Marine Corps is the increased productivity 
of the officer with a graduate degree. This thesis analyzes the differences in retention and 
promotion rates between officers with and without graduate degrees. Data from the 
FY1998 through FY2001 lieutenant colonel promotion boards and data for the 
corresponding accession cohorts, who entered the Marine Corps between FY1980 and 
FY1984 are merged with Automated Fitness Report System (AFRS) data. Nonparametric 
analysis and simple Probit techniques are used to estimate retention and promotion 
models. The results suggest that, in addition to other factors, graduate degrees from NPS 
and from sources other than NPS both have a positive effect on the retention and 
promotion of Marine officers. Several statistical techniques are applied to correct for 
potential biases due to self selection and sample selection. However, results from these 
techniques prove sensitive to slight changes in model specification and therefore, are not 
conclusive. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps enters the 21st Century in the face of substantial changes in its 
operating, technological, and economic environments, all of which promise only 
uncertainty for the future. We conduct training in preparation for familiar military 
scenarios, but only education can prepare us for such an uncertain future. While efforts to 
increase the foundation of general education throughout the officer corps cannot 
guarantee victory on the modern battlefield, education can certainly improve the ability to 
adapt more quickly to the changing environment. In particular, graduate education for 
Marine Corps officers could enhance the foundation of intellect to provide a more 
productive, more versatile officer corps that is better prepared to lead and make decisions 
in an uncertain future and to adapt to the new environment. A recent National Academy 
of Sciences study (Volume 4: Human Resources of Technology for the United States 
Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035) describes the value of graduate education: 
Graduate education provides career-long enhancement of the abilities of 
an officer, not just a technical specialty skill. Development of problem- 
solving skills is applicable to all kinds of problems that face the individual 
in unexpected situations. It is self-evident that there is little time for such 
education in wartime. The time to devote resources to obtaining graduate 
education is when the nation is at peace. It should be a high priority whose 
payoff is enhanced performance in times of war as well as in time of 
peace. Graduate education is a generator of future readiness with a high 
rate of return. (National Academy of Sciences 1997, 39) 
Analysis of the Marine Corps' existing graduate education programs will provide 
insight into the incentives of individual officers to participate in and the incentives of the 
Marine Corps to support these programs. Based on the traditional economic assumption 
that rational individuals and organizations respond to incentives, the individual officer is 
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influenced by the effect of participation in graduate education programs on promotion to 
higher ranks as well as the potential earnings differential available in the private sector. 
Likewise, the Marine Corps is influenced by the difference in actual productivity between 
officers who participate in graduate education programs and those who do not as well as 
the difference in the retention rates of officers who participate and those who do not. 
The economic theory of human capital suggests that a firm invests in the training 
and education of its workers and tries to ensure a return on that investment. This return 
can take the form of increased workplace productivity. In the case of the Marine Corps' 
investment in graduate education for its officers, the true returns in productivity are 
difficult to measure as officers with graduate education potentially make greater 
contributions to the combat readiness of the Corps, a concept that is difficult to measure. 
Traditional economic theory suggests that productivity is measured through level of pay. 
Since the military's pay system is not structured to reflect on-the-job productivity 
differences, alternate productivity indicators such as retention, performance reports and 
promotion must be used as quantitative indicators of the payoff from graduate education 
to the Marine Corps and to measure the return on investment. 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps currently has three primary graduate education programs for its 
officers: the Life Long Learning (LLL) program, the Special Education Program 
(SEP)and the intermediate-level Professional Military Education (PME) institutions. All 
three programs serve different purposes and are administered by different organizations 
within the Manpower and Reserve Affairs Division at Headquarters Marine Corps and 
Marine Corps University. 
Administered by Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS), the mission of the 
LLL Program is "to provide personal and professional learning opportunities to the 
Marine Corps community. The LLL Program positively impacts the recruitment, 
retention and readiness of active duty Marines and provides commanders with a valuable 
tool to prevent problems which detract from unit readiness." (MCO 1560.25C) One 
primary element of the LLL program is the Tuition Assistance (TA) Program, which 
provides officers and enlisted personnel with a 75 percent tuition subsidy to attend off- 
duty education at the same time they are fulfilling their normal military duties. In the 
case of officers, TA is only provided for enrollment in graduate or doctorate level 
programs. Participants can enroll in any degree field in any accredited, degree-granting 
educational institution. (MCO pl560.25C) 
Perceptions of the LLL program are consistent with its mission statement in that 
the program is seen as more of a fringe benefit of military service than an investment in 
the Marine Corps' stock of human capital. A spillover effect of officer participation in 
off-duty graduate education programs could provide the Marine Corps with an officer 
who is more adaptable to changing environments, more prepared to think critically and 
able to provide deeper analysis than before his graduate school experience. In this regard, 
the Marine Corps' return on this program is somewhat irrelevant to the specific field of 
study chosen by the officer. 
The LLL Program draws mixed reviews from the perspectives of the Marine 
Corps and the individual officers. From the organizational perspective, some recognize 
an increase in productivity from the officer with graduate education and benefits in the 
form of improvements in retention and recruiting. Others perceive off-duty graduate 
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education as a distraction from an officer's assigned duties for what is really a "stepping 
stone" to a lucrative job in the private sector. In that light, some view those programs as 
having a negative effect on retention. From the individual perspective, some Marines 
perceive off-duty graduate education as an opportunity to fulfill personal goals as well as 
make themselves more proficient officers. Others are apprehensive about participating 
because they perceive that participation could make them less competitive for promotion 
in the future. 
Actaiinistered by the Officer Assignment Section, the Marine Corps' Special 
Education Program (SEP) is designed to provide qualified officers to fill the several 
hundred billets with a field-specific postgraduate education requirement. The SEP 
program primarily involves full time attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
where officers receive full pay and benefits. The remaining officers receive graduate 
education from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). Officers assigned to SEP 
are not assigned any regular military duties during their studies, which last from one to 
two years. Officers assigned to SEP training are taken from the pool of officers available 
for assignment throughout the Marine Corps, thus some commands pay a price for the 
program in the form of unmanned billets. (MCO 1520.9F) 
Education provided at the Naval Postgraduate School provides a mix of general 
and firm-specific education and training. Specific curricula are those that are specially 
tailored to suit the needs of the Naval Service and the U.S. military. Marine officers who 
attend the Naval Postgraduate School or AFIT typically spend five to six years away 
from "normal" career paths while they attend school and fulfill a payback requirement in 
a billet that requires both the general and firm-specific training and education. Officers 
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who return to their normal occupational fields after this time do so with a greater 
foundation of general education and a broader perspective of the big picture that, in 
principle, should contribute to their increased productivity. 
Like the Voluntary Education Program, the SEP draws mixed perceptions about 
its utility to the Marine Corps. Some believe SEP is a stepping-stone to the private sector 
for those with career aspirations outside the Marine Corps. Others maintain a healthy 
appreciation for the expertise and critical analysis provided by SEP-educated officers. 
There is both anecdotal evidence and a common perception that SEP-educated officers 
get promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel at lower rates than non-SEP officers. 
In recent years, there has been an indication that these perceptions may be 
influencing officers' decisions to apply for SEP. While the Marine Corps traditionally 
holds one SEP board annually to select graduate school attendees from those volunteers 
with the greatest potential for promotion to the next rank, they have been forced to hold 
two boards annually for the last four years due to a shortage of applicants. The Marine 
Corps currently forecasts 14 vacant seats at NPS during the 2001-2002 academic year 
due to a shortage of applicants. Mark Brinkley from the Marine Corps Times highlights 
the possible reasons for this shortage: 
The trouble, some officers say, is that Marines view the Naval 
Postgraduate School as a career-ending institution, a place to go if you 
want to get out of the Marine Corps and hope to set yourself up for a big 
money job outside. (Brinkley 2001,16) 
Most officers who volunteer for SEP do so with an understanding of the risks 
associated with these perceptions, and they are no less dedicated to their careers and no 
less loyal to the Marine Corps. This thesis will examine these perceptions and provide 
evidence regarding the retention and promotion of SEP-educated officers compared to 
their peers. 
Administered by Marine Corps University, the Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College (CSC) offers the opportunity to obtain a Master of Military Studies (MMS) for 
those who attend the full-time resident program provided they complete a thesis in 
addition to their standard curriculum. The mission of the CSC is to provide professional 
military education (PME) to field grade officers to prepare them for various duties with 
Marine Corps, joint and multinational military commands. (Marine Corps Command and 
Staff College 2000) 
The Marine Corps also sends officers to equivalent intermediate-level PME 
schools from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Army Command and General Staff 
College, the Naval War College and the Air Command and Staff College all offer degrees 
equivalent to the Master of Military Studies to their resident students. The education 
received at these PME institutions is firm-specific in nature and serves to enhance an 
officer's productivity within the military establishment. Completion of a resident or non- 
resident intermediate-level PME course is considered essential for promotion to the rank 
of lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps; however, only those officers who attend the 
resident programs are eligible for the MMS degree. Acceptance into these resident 
programs is extremely competitive. 
The Marine Corps' outlook on its graduate education programs is consistent with 
the 1975 House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations Report regarding full- 
time training and education: 
The Department of Defense does not have an obligation or mission to 
provide education or training beyond that which is required to maintain a 
professional military force. Education for the sake of education is not a 
function of the Department of Defense. (Mahon 1975, 54) 
In discussion regarding the distinction between the requirements for professional 
military education and civilian graduate education, the Committee on Appropriations 
indicated that it did not value any spillover benefits from graduate education beyond 
validated, field-specific education requirements: "The point must be made that a master's 
degree is just an indication of civilian educational attainment and may or may not have 
relevance to the needs of the military services." (Mahon 1975, 61) 
B.        PURPOSE AND INTENT 
This research will develop the economic theory of human capital as it relates to 
the return to graduate education and Naval Postgraduate School education. The return on 
investment is based on differences in retention of Marine Corps officers and on 
promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel for those with graduate degrees. The objective 
of the research is to derive accurate measures of effectiveness regarding the impact of 
graduate education in general and specifically of a degree from the Naval Postgraduate 
School. The outcomes are measured as the retention of Marine officers and the joint 
probability of retention and promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Differences in 
these measures could be used as a basis in a future cost benefit analysis of the Marine 
Corps' graduate education programs. 
Prior studies that evaluated the Marine Corps' return to graduate education 
focused on retention and promotion to the ranks of major through colonel; however, the 
studies that analyzed the effect of graduate education on promotion to lieutenant colonel 
and colonel were not based on entire accession cohorts since such data were unavailable. 
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Prior studies also did not analyze the change in returns to graduate education over time, 
which could reflect changing attitudes toward graduate education. 
This thesis is unique in that it will analyze data from the 1998 through 2001 
lieutenant colonel promotion boards. It will also use data from the accession cohorts that 
were commissioned between 21 December 1979 and 28 September 1984. These samples 
will be used as the basis for analyzing retention and the joint probability of retention and 
promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. The effects of graduate education on 
retention and promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel are important since on average, 
Marine officers don't complete graduate education until after they have already been 
selected for the rank of major which is an up-or-out point in an officer's career. 
C.        ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II presents a review of the relevant prior literature regarding the effects of 
graduate education on the retention, performance and promotion of Marine Corps 
officers. The review covers general literature on the economics of education, military- 
specific graduate education models, and econometric methodology and selection bias 
issues. Chapter III addresses the various data sources, construction of analysis data sets 
and definitions of the analysis variables. Chapter IV discusses the descriptive statistics 
and preliminary analysis. Chapter V presents the econometric methodology and 
specification of the estimating models. Statistical results are also discussed. Chapter IV 
provides conclusions derived from the results, limitations to the analysis and 
recommendations for further research on the Marine Corps' graduate education 
programs. 
II.      LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.       THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
The review of relevant literature regarding the impact of graduate education on 
retention and promotion of Marine officers should begin with discussion of the 
fundamental concepts relating to the economics of education. Such concepts include the 
economic theory of human capital, measurements of the benefits of education, labor 
market segmentation theory, and selectivity bias. 
The economic theory of human capital refers to investment in human beings as 
assets that will provide income in the future, similar to investments in physical capital. As 
with physical capital, the costs of investment in human capital are compared to the 
expected flow of future income. Critics of the theory argue that educational achievement 
may simply serve as a signal of superior ability as opposed to actually increasing the 
level of knowledge and skill. (Woodhall 1987a) 
Economists often conclude that a "weak" version of the "screening philosophy" is 
valid since many employers do use educational attainment as a screening tool. However, 
there is no evidence to suggest that education does not increase individual productivity. 
In his review of human capital concepts, M. Woodhall discusses the importance of the 
screening hypothesis: 
The screening hypothesis serves as a reminder that education does 
far more than impart knowledge and skills. The reason why employers 
continue to prefer educated workers is that not only does the possession of 
an educational qualification indicate that an individual has certain abilities, 
aptitudes and attitudes, but the educational process helps shape and 
develop those attributes. (Woodhall 1987a, 23-24) 
Investment in human capital generates benefits for the individual who participates 
and for society as a whole. The individual benefits from increased opportunities for 
employment and increased earnings. Individual costs include direct costs for tuition and 
books, and the opportunity cost of foregone earnings and leisure time due to the time 
spent on educational activities. Society also benefits from the increased productivity of its 
workers. Governments and corporations throughout the world recognize this return to 
society and subsidize all or part of the education costs for their citizens. (Woodhall 
1987a) 
In his 1987 essay "The Range of Educational Benefits" L.C. Solmon highlights 
the difficulty in assessing the benefits of an educational program. He acknowledges that 
economists tend to focus on readily measurable impacts, such as earnings differentials, 
while often overlooking the less obvious: "The problem is that numerous psychological, 
behavioral, cognitive, and effective impacts of schooling are very difficult to identify, 
and once identified, even more difficult to evaluate."(Solmon 1987, 85) He also 
highlights the difficulty of attributing all differences to educational achievement, since no 
two individuals in treatment and control groups are exactly alike and their true abilities 
and potential can never be measured. (Solmon 1987) 
Economists share the fundamental assumptions that the predominant benefit of 
education is the increase in productivity and that the increased market earnings of the 
more educated worker reflect this increase in productivity. Productivity is reflected in a 
worker's increased efficiency and overall value to the employer. According to Woodhall, 
"classical and neoclassical economic theory assume that relative prices of goods and 
services and the relative wages and salaries of workers reflect their scarcity and hence, in 
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the case of workers, their productivity." (Woodhall 1987b, 216) Since highly educated 
workers are more scarce than less educated workers, workers with higher levels of 
education receive greater salaries and wages. Thus, earnings differentials can be used to 
measure the economic return to educational attainment. (Woodhall 1987b) 
Segmentation theory of labor markets suggests that the relationships between 
productivity and earnings are systematically different between the public sector, which 
includes the military, and the private sector. In his 1987 essay "Public Sector 
Employment and Education," K. Hinchliffe argues that a dominant characteristic of 
public sector employment is the internal labor market in which salaries and promotions 
are based not on individual productivity but rather on seniority, objective educational 
standards and "custom and practice." Such criteria define "relative wages along job 
ladders rather than by reference to supply and demand." (Hinchcliffe 1987, 225) In the 
internal labor market, educational qualifications serve as merely indicators of potential 
productivity and aptitude for training. (Hinchcliffe 1987) 
Research regarding the economics of education is often questioned because of the 
potential for selection bias. Participation in educational programs that is not based on 
random assignment is affected by the personal choice of the participant as well as the 
choice of the educational institution. One can never truly know the potential earnings of a 
non-participant under the presumption that he did participate. Likewise, one can never 
know the true potential earnings of the participant had he not participated. Empirical 
research shows a consistent correlation between ability and years of schooling completed. 
Those with greater cognitive ability are more likely to voluntarily participate in and more 
likely to be selected for educational programs (Rosen 1987). According to R. Rosen 
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(1987), the only way to address the problem of selection bias is to construct models that 
reflect personal choice for participation in a given educational program. 
B.        STUDIES   ON   RETENTION   AND   PROMOTION    OF   MILITARY 
OFFICERS 
1.        Study by Cymrot 
In his 1986 study "Graduate Education and the Promotion of Officers," Donald J. 
Cymrot argues that individual productivity in the military can be assessed by indicators 
such as performance evaluations, retention and promotion. Since officers are charged 
with greater levels of responsibility and receive higher salaries as they get promoted, 
promotion is an adequate indicator of productivity. His study used a logistic regression 
(LOGIT) model to evaluate the effects of fully-funded graduate education on the 
promotion of Navy officers. 
Cymrot's study used cross sectional data from the 1985 Officer Master File to 
analyze the relationship between graduate education and promotion of officers to the 
ranks of 0-4 through 0-7. The data is restricted to those officers whose length of service 
is between 8 and 30 years. He recognizes a potential selection bias in his study, which 
results from the fact that his data do not contain records of officers who left active duty 
prior to 1985. 
While the obvious explanatory variable in his model is graduate education, 
Cymrot also included variables for age, sex, race, time in grade for previous ranks, 
continuous active service and branch designation. Since selection for fully-funded 
graduate education is based on potential for promotion to the next rank, a positive 
coefficient of the graduate education variable does not necessarily demonstrate causality 
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due to potential selection bias. Cymrot included variables for time in previous grades and 
service continuity to correct for this selection bias. 
Cymrot hypothesized that an officer who has such an outstanding record that he 
was selected for promotion to previous ranks ahead of his accession cohort must be more 
productive. His variables for time in previous grades serve as indicators of productivity at 
various points throughout an officer's career and should be unrelated to the impact of 
graduate education. Likewise, his service continuity variable was also used to control for 
the productivity difference associated with officers with continuous or interrupted active 
service. 
The effect of graduate education on promotion was significant and positive for the 
ranks of 0-4 through 0-6 and not significant for promotion to 0-7. The inclusion of 
adjustments for productivity, unrelated to graduate education, indicate that graduate 
education does increase the probability of promotion to the next rank. The marginal 
effects of having a graduate degree increase the probability of promotion to 0-4 by 26 
percent and promotion to 0-5 by 10.5 percent. The time in grade at previous rank 
variables were negative and significant which indicate that the less time one spent in 
previous ranks, the more likely they were to be promoted to their current rank. Cymrot 
also found that the age variable (presumably age at commission) was significant in that 
older officers were more likely to be promoted than younger officers. 
While Cymrot focused his study on the effects of graduate education on 
promotion alone, he acknowledged that his findings only partially identified the marginal 
productivity benefit of graduate education since he didn't analyze effects on productivity 
within given ranks or retention. Additionally, Cymrot did not attempt to correct for any 
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sample selection issues associated with question of whether or not an officer remained on 
active duty long enough to be considered by the promotion board. This issue presents 
another potential for bias in his findings for graduate education since his samples 
included only those officers who remained on active duty long enough to be considered 
for promotion. 
2.        Study by North and Smith 
In their 1993. study "Officer Accession Characteristics and Promotions to Captain 
and Major," North and Smith used an econometric technique called the bivariate probit 
with sample selection to assess the joint probability of whether or not on a Marine officer 
remained on active duty long enough to be considered for promotion to the ranks of 
captain and major and whether or not they were in fact promoted. The goal of their study 
was to isolate race and ethnicity effects on promotion rates of Marine officers while 
statistically controlling for other effects. 
North and Smith used data from the Longitudinal TBS File and merged it with 
promotion data from the Headquarters Marine Corps Master File. The TBS Longitudinal 
File is maintained by the Center for Naval Analysis to track changes in an officer's 
record from the time of TBS throughout their career. Their data covered the entire 
accession cohort of officers commissioned between FY1980 and FY1991 as well as data 
on the FY1984 through FY1983 promotion boards for captain and FY1992 through 
FY1993 promotion boards for Major. Since analysis of promotion results was based on 
those who remained on active duty until the time of the selection board, they created two 
samples for each promotion category. The first sample consisted of the entire accession 
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cohort and the second consisted of only those who were considered in the primary zone at 
a given promotion board. 
Their use of the bivariate probit with sample selection allowed them to correct for 
sample selection bias, which may result from unmeasured factors affecting retention that 
also affect the likelihood of promotion. North and Smith assumed that an officer's 
separation decision prior to a given promotion board was negatively related to their 
likelihood of selection for promotion. This technique required them to jointly estimate 
two equations: one for the likelihood of retention to each promotion board and a second 
for the likelihood of promotion among those who stayed to each board. They then 
determined the value of the rho term, which is the value of the correlation between the 
error terms of the two equations and assessed its significance; rho was statistically 
significant, which indicated the presence of a selectivity bias caused by unobserved 
factors correlated with both retention and promotion. 
North and Smith's models included explanatory variables for personal 
characteristics that included race, age at accession, marriage at accession and prior 
service status. They also included variables to analyze the effect of occupational specialty 
based on the general military occupational specialty (MOS) categories of combat, 
aviation, ground support, aviation support and service. Finally, they considered the 
effects of accession source and year of promotion board since different promotion boards 
have different promotion opportunity and size. 
North and Smith found that Naval Academy graduates and NROTC graduates 
were more likely to be promoted to the ranks of captain and major than officers from 
other accession sources. Officers who were married at the time of accession and aviators 
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were also more likely to be promoted than unmarried officers and officers from other 
MOS categories. North and Smith found that gender and GCT score were not statistically 
significant in the probability of promotion. While they found that black and other 
minority officers are less likely to be promoted to the rank of captain than white officers, 
they found that race was not a significant factor for promotion to major. 
3.        Study by Bowman and Mehay 
In their 1999 study "Graduate education and employee performance: evidence 
from military personnel," Bowman and Mehay examined the relationship between 
individual productivity and graduate education by analyzing the effect of graduate 
education on promotion to the rank of lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy. Their 
study focused on promotion as the performance measure of interest although individual 
fitness report measures were also used as explanatory variables in their estimating 
models. A significant portion of their study was dedicated to the statistical correction of 
selectivity bias that comes with an individual's personal decision, and the Navy's 
selection of individuals to participate in funded graduate education programs. Bowman 
and Mehay used data from the Navy's Promotion History File and merged it with fitness 
report data for all line and staff officers considered for promotion to 0-4 between 1985 
and 1990 (roughly, year groups 1975 through 1980). 
Bowman and Mehay specified a series of models to isolate the effect of graduate 
education on promotion. They included variables that demonstrated cognitive skill such 
as college GPA, a technical undergraduate degree and graduate education, and they 
included variables that demonstrated affective skills such as accession source. They also 
included the standard demographic characteristics such as race, sex and marital status. 
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Their first four models used the single stage probit technique. Each model 
increased the number of controls in order to isolate the effect of graduate education. The 
first model included only the demographic characteristics and graduate education; the 
second added the cognitive characteristics; the third added the affective characteristics; 
and the fourth added a measure of early performance evaluations. With the successive 
inclusion of controls, the marginal effects of graduate education on probability of 
promotion decreased by close to 40 percent from .098 to .065 and from .145 to .089 for 
line and staff officers, respectively. 
In order to rid the error term of their model from any remaining correlation to 
possession of a graduate degree, Bowman and Mehay chose a two stage bivariate probit 
technique similar to that used by North and Smith (1993). They first estimated a probit 
model to assess the likelihood of graduate school acceptance and completion. In addition 
to the standard explanatory variables from their previous models, they added 
"instrumental variables" (omitted from their original single stage models) that reflected 
an officer's previous desire to undertake graduate education, undergraduate performance 
in math and science, and dummies for warfare community. Bowman and Mehay included 
the variables of desire for graduate education, undergraduate performance and warfare 
community in the graduate education selection model since they were theoretically 
related to selection for graduate education and not related to promotion to 0-4. 
The bivariate probit model required the joint specification of a second model that 
assessed the likelihood of promotion to 0-4 and included all of the original explanatory 
variables from the single stage probit. The covariance of the error terms (rho) in the two 
models of the bivariate probit was also estimated. 
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The results of the bivariate probit showed that the rho term was statistically 
significant and that the coefficient of the graduate education variable had decreased in 
comparison to results from the simple probit model. This finding held true for individual 
models for line and staff officers (with fully-funded graduate degrees only and with 
graduate degree from any source). Thus, selectivity bias from unobserved factors that 
relate to both selection for graduate education and promotion do impart an upward bias 
on the graduate education coefficient in the promotion model. Ranging from .045 to .056 
in the bivariate probit models, the marginal effects indicate that even after controlling for 
selectivity bias, officers with graduate education are more likely to be promoted to 0-4 
than officers without graduate education. 
4. Study by Wielsma 
In his 1996 Naval Postgraduate School thesis "An Analysis Of Factors Affecting 
Promotion, Retention and Performance For USMC Officers: A Graduate Education 
Perspective," Ronald J. Wielsma attempted to analyze the factors associated with 
promotion to 0-4 (major), retention to the 0-4 promotion point and actual performance 
ratings with specific emphasis on the effects of graduate education. While most studies 
on the factors affecting promotion simply evaluate data from the pertinent promotion 
board, Wielsma used longitudinal data from the FY1980 officer accession cohort, which 
allowed him to study the effect of graduate education on retention and the effect of 
graduate education on the joint probability of retention to the 0-4 promotion point and 
selection for promotion. 
Wielsma initially recognized the potential for self-selection bias and sample 
selection bias on his graduate education estimates. An officer's retention decision and 
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likelihood of promotion are likely affected by characteristics such as ability and taste that 
are unobserved and also impact their personal decision to attend graduate school. An 
officer's selection for promotion to 0-4 is affected by their retention to the 0-4 
promotion point. The majority of Wielsma's study addressed the recognition and impact 
of such bias. 
Wielsma first ran a simple probit model with promotion to 0-4 as his binary 
dependent variable and used only the sample of those who remained on active duty until 
the promotion board. Consistent with Wise (1975), and Bowman and Mehay (1999), 
Wielsma organized his explanatory variables into cognitive traits, affective traits and 
demographic traits. His cognitive traits included graduate education, performance 
evaluation index, GCT score, and rank at TBS. Affective traits included MOS category, 
accession source, and enlisted service status. In this simple model he found that the 
effects of graduate education and the performance index were significant and positive. 
To address the self-selection bias and sample selection bias, Wielsma chose the 
two stage Heckman Procedure (Heckman 1979). He first used the simple PROBIT to 
model the probability of selection for graduate education in order to derive an inverse 
Mill's ratio, which accounts for all unobserved effects still present in the error term. He 
also ran a simple PROBIT to model the likelihood of retention to the point of promotion 
in order evaluate impacts on retention as well as develop a second Mills' ratio. In his 
retention model he found graduate education, the performance index and marital status to 
be positive and significant. He found class rank at TBS and unemployment rate at time of 
separation to be negative and significant. According to Wielsma, unemployment rate was 
the most significant factor affecting retention. 
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In the second stage of the Heckman procedure, Wielsma included both Mills' 
ratios in his initial structural equation for promotion to 0-4. He also used ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to evaluate the binary possibility of promotion. Not only did he find the 
coefficient of his second Mills' ratio (correction for the retention issue) to be negative 
and significant, he found the signs of graduate education, performance index and marital 
status became negative and significant. Additionally he found that pilots were more likely 
than officers from other MOS categories to be promoted and that Naval Academy and 
NROTC graduates were less likely than officers from other commissioning sources to be 
promoted. Since Wielsma used OLS (a linear function) to model the binary outcome of 
promotion (a non-linear function) in his second stage, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients can provide useful insights while the magnitude of the coefficients cannot 
because they are inconsistent. 
5.        Study by Long 
In his 1992 Thesis "Effect of Variables Independent of Performance on 
Promotion Rates to Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel in the Marine Corps," Peter 
Long attempted to identify the characteristics that affected promotion to the ranks of 0-4 
through 0-6 in the Marine Corps. Long used historical, cross-sectional data for those 
officers in the primary promotion zone for the ranks of 0-4 through 0-6 during FY1986 
through FY1992. Long did not use a performance evaluation measure in his research 
since such data were not available to him. 
Using the logistic regression function, Long combined the data for the entire 
period from FY1986 through FY1992 to develop separate models for each rank. Long 
found that married officers, officers who had completed the appropriate level professional 
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military education (PME), and officers with graduate degrees were more likely to be 
promoted than unmarried officers, those without PME and those without graduate 
degrees. Long found the factors relating to race, sex and combat experience were not 
statistically significant for promotion to any rank. 
6.        Study by Estridge 
In his 1995 thesis "A Comparative Analysis Of Promotion Probabilities For 
Marine Corps Field Grade Officers With Special Attention Given to Graduates Of The 
Naval Postgraduate School," David Estridge attempted to identify those factors that most 
affected promotion to the ranks of 0-4 and 0-5 in the Marine Corps. Using data from the 
1993 and 1994 promotion boards to 0-4 and 0-5, Estridge specifically focused on the 
effects of graduate education from NPS. Estridge claimed that selection for the SEP 
program, which predominantly consists of programs at NPS, was extremely competitive 
during the years that corresponded to his study. 
Estridge developed a performance evaluation index by assigning values of each of 
the individual quality indicators and performance indicators on the fitness report. He then 
took the mean value of all of the observed marks for the quality indicators and 
performance indicators and added them together to achieve a final performance 
evaluation index. The value of his performance evaluation index ranged from 1 to 12, but 
his mean index yielded 11.78 and 11.66 for captains and majors, respectively, which 
indicated hyper-inflation of fitness report marks by reporting seniors. 
Results of his logistic regression models indicate that accession source, MOS, 
number of personal awards and NPS graduation had a positive impact on promotion to 
the rank of 0-4 and that race, accession source, personal awards and NPS graduation had 
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a positive impact on promotion to 0-5. His performance evaluation index had the greatest 
impact on promotion to both ranks. 
In his descriptive statistics, Estridge noted the differences in selection rates for 
NPS graduates over non-NPS graduates at close to 12 percent for 0-4 and 0.3 percent for 
0-5. Even when other explanatory variables were held constant, NPS graduation proved 
to have a positive impact on promotion to both ranks. Estridge recognized the Marine 
Corps' stiff selection process for NPS: "the Special Education Selection Boards are 
simply doing a very good job in selecting officers to attend NPS - officers that probably 
would have been selected for major and lieutenant colonel regardless of their selection to 
attend the Naval Postgraduate School."(1995) Estridge made no attempt to correct for 
this selection process and the potential selection bias in his estimates. 
7. Study By Grillo 
In his 1996 Naval Postgraduate School Thesis "A Study Of Promotion To Major 
In The Marine Corps," Mark Grillo used a logistic regression model to estimate the 
effects of race and sex on promotion to 0-4. Although race and sex were his primary 
focus, Grillo also evaluated the effects of other factors related to promotion such as 
graduate education, dependents, promotion zone classification and whether or not an 
officer's MOS was given special consideration in the board precept. Grillo used a 
performance evaluation index similar to those created by Wielsma (1996) and Estridge 
(1995). His data consisted only of the sample of officers considered for promotion to 0-4 
during the 1994 and 1995 boards. Hence he did not consider the retention effect based on 
the whole accession cohort. Grillo acknowledged that the limited scope of his data might 
reduce external validity since each promotion board has its own selection criteria. 
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Grillo hypothesized that since blacks were promoted at a 20 percent lower rate 
than whites, minority status should have a negative impact on promotion in his 
multivariate model. He hypothesized that graduate education and number of personal 
awards and performance evaluation index would have a positive impact on promotion. 
Grillo used individual binomial logit models to estimate the effects on promotion 
to 0-4 during the FY1994 and FY1995 boards. While Grillo did not discuss a combined 
model with both promotion boards, it is assumed that a log-likelihood ratio test indicated 
that the coefficients were statistically different for the two separate models. Although he 
found that the variables associated with race, sex, dependents and graduate education 
were not significant, Grillo found that officers with greater numbers of personal awards, 
those considered by the promotion board for the first time and those with a performance 
index in the highest ten percent were more likely to be selected for promotion to major. 
8.        Study by Esmann 
In his 1984 NPS Thesis "Marine Officer Attrition Model," William Esmann 
attempted to develop an attrition prediction model that was more sophisticated and more 
accurate than reliance on historical average attrition rates. While he did not evaluate the 
effect of promotion potential on attrition, Esmann did hypothesize that officers with 
greater potential for promotion to higher ranks would be less likely to leave the Marine 
Corps since they assumed less risk remaining in a dead-end job. His research on the 
effects of unemployment on attrition is relevant to the retention of Marine officers and 
this thesis. 
Basing his research on attrition data for the ranks of 0-2 through 0-5 during 
FY1977 through FY1983, Esmann used simple OLS regression models to analyze 
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impacts on attrition rates for each rank. He found that in every year the most significant 
predictor of attrition was the unemployment rate followed by military pay. Attrition rates 
were the highest when the unemployment rate and military pay were the lowest. 
9.        Study by Theilmann 
In a 1990 NPS thesis "Analysis of the Factors Affecting Marine Corps Officer 
Retention," Robert Theilmann examined factors that affected retention of male, 
company-grade officers (0-1 through 0-3) who had not yet completed their initial service 
obligation. He first used factor analysis to narrow the pool of variables that were drawn 
from the 1985 DOD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel and Defense Manpower 
Data Center and then used logistic regression techniques to analyze the binary outcome 
of whether or not an officer actually remained on active duty past his initial service 
obligation. 
In his detailed analysis, Theilmann evaluated the effects of perceptions of the 
working environment and personal opportunities, demographic information, MOS and 
various time and tenure characteristics. He did not evaluate the effect of graduate 
education. He found that the factors that have the greatest impact on an officer's retention 
decision are commissioning source, marital status, MOS, race and various factors of job 
satisfaction. Officers from the Naval Academy and NROTC were more likely to remain 
than other sources. Married officers with children were more likely to remain than 
married officers without children and unmarried officers. Officers with support MOSs 
were less likely to remain on active duty. Minority officers were more likely to remain on 
active duty than Caucasian officers. 
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10.      Study by Miller 
In his 1995 NPS Thesis "Impact of The Drawdown on Minority Officer 
Retention," Brian Miller attempted to analyze the differences between minority and non- 
minority officer retention as affected by the drawdown of the U.S. Military in the early 
1990s. He used logistic regression models to individually analyze the differences in 
separation behavior for the 1977, 1980, 1983 and 1987 officer cohorts during each career 
phase. 
Analysis of separation probability density functions allowed Miller to distinguish 
separate phases of an officer's career, each of which corresponds to different decision 
criteria for retention. The "attrition phase" lies between zero and four years in which an 
officer is usually bound by a service obligation. The "early-decision phase" lies between 
the fifth and eleventh year of service in which an officer is free to make his own decision 
to leave but is not yet committed to a long-term career. The "career phase" lies between 
the twelfth and twentieth year of service during which an officer has likely been 
promoted to 0-4 and must accept the results of the 0-5 selection board and either leave 
active duty or wait until retirement eligibility with full pension and benefits at 20 years. 
While Miller found little convincing evidence of a difference in minority versus 
non-minority attrition, his results did reveal a significant trend regarding the possession 
of a graduate degree. For each cohort, officers with graduate degrees were less likely to 
separate during the early career phases and more likely to separate during the later career 
phases. This is not a surprising result given the obligated service of the "attrition phase," 
but it is also consistent throughout the "early decision phase" and "career phase." 
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III.    DATA 
A.       COLLECTION 
Data for this thesis were collected from several different sources. Promotion 
board data for the "in-zone" population of majors (0-4) considered by the FY1998 
through FY2001 lieutenant colonel (0-5) promotion boards were collected from the 
Manpower Plans Division at Headquarters Marine Corps. This data consisted of social 
security number, whether or not an officer was selected for promotion and year of the 
board. "In-zone" refers to the status of being part of the primary promotion cohort 
considered for promotion for the first time. The Marine Corps does not generally promote 
officers from the "below-zone" (i.e, early) category to 0-5. 
Since an officer's date of commission is the basis for promotion from 0-1 to 0-2, 
it therefore affects subsequent promotions throughout an officer's career, as officers are 
identified by their year of commission. Data were collected for each accession cohort of 
Marine officers commissioned as second lieutenants (0-1) from 21 December 1979 
through 28 September 1984. These dates correspond to the dates of commission for the 
senior officer from the FY1998 lieutenant colonel selection board and the junior officer 
considered by the FY2001 lieutenant colonel selection board. 
The primary source for accession cohort data was the "Longitudinal TBS File," 
which was provided by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). This file consisted of 
personal characteristics at the time of commissioning, performance at The Basic School 
(TBS), highest educational attainment on record and separation data for all officers 
commissioned between the dates of interest (1979-1984) who remained on active duty 
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past November 1984. This file did not include officers who separated from active duty 
prior to November 1984. 
Additional accession cohort data were collected from the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) West, and the Manpower Information (MI), and Performance 
Evaluation divisions at Headquarters Marine Corps. This data consisted of characteristics 
relating to professional military education, personal awards, civilian educational 
attainment, prior enlisted service status, marital status as of last recorded observation, and 
number of dependents as of the last recorded observation. The performance evaluation 
data consisted of fitness report markings for all officers from the corresponding accession 
cohort for the ranks of 0-1 through 0-3. 
Finally, data regarding graduate education were collected from the Registrar at the 
Naval Postgraduate School on all Marine officers who graduated from the Naval 
Postgraduate School between 1983 and 2000. 
All data files were matched by social security number and date of commission 
and merged to create a single data file for analysis. Observations with missing critical 
data were removed from the sample, as were observations for officers commissioned 
without at least an undergraduate degree. Social security numbers were deleted from the 
data file to eliminate any privacy concerns. The only data that remained in the data set 
were those records that corresponded to the Longitudinal TBS File provided by CNA. 
Because of the limitations of the baseline CNA data set, 599 observations were deleted. 
Thus, the analysis file contains complete records for 6,507 officers commissioned as O-l s 
during the period 21 December 1979 through 28 September 1984. This sample of 6,507 
officers will be referred to as the Accession Cohort Sample. 
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Sample selection issues based on the limitations of the CNA data set are not 
considered a serious weakness. The difference between the entire accession cohort 
population and the available sample is approximately 600 officers or 10 percent. An 
officer commissioned in early 1980 would have had to remain on active duty for a period 
of less than five years to be excluded from the sample. An officer commissioned in early 
1982 would have had to remain on active duty for less than three years to be excluded 
from the sample. Most of these separations would have been due to medical or other 
special reasons. The data set accurately reflects officers commissioned later in the 
accession cohort who spent relatively short periods on active duty. Additionally, 
minimum service requirements (MSR) during the period that correspond to the accession 
cohort ranged from three years for the general ground assignable officer to six years for 
those officers with a guarantee of aviation training. Based on the available sample, the 
average time spent on active duty was approximately 8.8 years. 
For the purpose of analyzing the probability of promotion to 0-5, a second sample 
was drawn as a subset of the Accession Cohort Sample. This second sample consists only 
of the officers who survived on active duty long enough to be considered for promotion 
to 0-5. This sample is called the Promotion Sample. 
B.       VARIABLE INTRODUCTION 
Model specification is based on Wise (1975), Wielsma (1996) and Bowman and 
Mehay (1999). Variables are grouped into the following categories: Outcomes, Cognitive 
Traits, Affective Traits, Performance Traits, Demographic Traits and Career Traits. Table 




SURVIVE = 1 IF SURVIVED TO THE 0-5 BOARD; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SELECT = 1 IF SELECTED FOR 0-5; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Performance Traits 
PINDEX CONTINUOUS, = PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INDEX 
GPA CONTINUOUS, = TBS OVERALL GPA 
AWARDS CONTINUOUS, = NUMBER OF PERSONAL AWARDS 
PME = 1 IF COMPLETED INTERMED LEVEL SCHOOL; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Cognitive Traits 
NPS = 1 IF AN NPS GRADUATE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
NOT NPS = 1 IF OBTAINED A NON-NPS GRAD DEGREE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
MASTERS = 1 IF OBTAINED ANY MASTERS DEGREE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
GCT CONTINUOUS, = GCT SCORE 
Affective Traits 
COMBAT = 1 IF RECEIVED ONE COMBAT FITREP; = 0 OTHERWISE 
PRIENL = 1 IF 4 YEARS ACTIVE ENLISTED TIME; = 0 OTHERWISE 
USNA = 1 IF COMMISSION SOURCE IS USNA; = 0 OTHERWISE 
NROTC = 1 IF COMMISSION SOURCE IS NROTC; = 0 OTHERWISE 
OTHER = 1 IF NOT COMMISS. FROM NROTC OR USNA; = 0 OTHERWISE 
CBTARMS = 1 IF MOS IS COMBAT ARMS; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SERVICE = 1 IF MOS IS SERVICE SUPPORT; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SUPPORT = 1 IF MOS IS COMBAT SUPPORT; = 0 OTHERWISE 
AVIATOR = 1 IF AN AVIATOR; = 0 OTHERWISE 
AVSPPT = 1 IF MOS IS AVIATION SUPPORT; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Demographic Traits 
COMM AGE CONTINUOUS, = AGE AT FIRST COMMISSION 
MARSTAT = 1 IF EVER MARRIED; = 0 OTHERWISE 
DEPEND CONTINUOUS, = NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 
SEX = 1 IF SEX IS MALE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
WHITE = 1 IF RACE IS WHITE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
BLACK = 1 IF RACE IS BLACK; = 0 OTHERWISE 
0 RACE = 1 IF RACE IS NOT WHITE OR BLACK; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Career Traits 
U RATE CONTINUOUS, NATIONAL U-RATE AT FIRST CAREER DECISION 
FY1998 = 1 IF IN-ZONE AT THE 1998 0-5 BOARD = 0 OTHERWISE 
FY1999 = 1 IF IN-ZONE AT THE 1999 0-5 BOARD = 0 OTHERWISE 
FY2000 = 1 IF IN-ZONE AT THE 2000 0-5 BOARD = 0 OTHERWISE 
FY2001 = 1 IF IN-ZONE AT THE 2001 0-5 BOARD = 0 OTHERWISE 
Table I. Variable Name and Description, Grouped by Category. 
1.        Outcomes 
The two major outcomes to be analyzed in this thesis are SURVIVE and 
SELECT. SURVIVE equals 1 if an officer remained on active duty long enough to be 
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considered by the 0-5 promotion board. SELECT is a binary variable that equals 1 if an 
officer, considered by the 0-5 selection board, was in fact selected for promotion. 
2.        Performance Traits 
Performance traits are indicators of actual performance at various points 
throughout an officer's career. PINDEX is a continuous variable for an officer's 
performance evaluation index. PINDEX was derived in a similar fashion to performance 
indexes constructed by Estridge (1995) and Wielsma (1996). The difference is that as 
described below, PINDEX weighted each individual fitness report based on the number 
of months of observation, whereas Estridge (1995) and Wielsma (1996) gave equal 
weight to each individual fitness report regardless of the number of months of 
observation. 
In particular, PINDEX is based on marks from Section B of the Marine Corps' 
fitness report used prior to 1998, which consisted of 21 different evaluations of 
performance characteristics and leadership traits. A copy of this fitness report form is 
included in Appendix A. Based on the possible markings, PINDEX assigned a value of 
0,1,3,5,7 and 9 for observations of Unsatisfactory, Below Average, Average, Above 
Average, Excellent and Outstanding, respectively. "Not Observed" fitness reports and 
"Not Observed" individual Section B markings were excluded from the calculation of 
PINDEX. For each officer, PINDEX calculated the weighted mean value for all 
observed Section B marks on each fitness report, summed the weighted means for all 
observed fitness reports received at the ranks of 0-1 through 0-3 and then divided by the 
total number of months of observation for all observed fitness reports combined. 
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PINDEX has a value that ranges from 0 to 9, with a mean of 8.566 and a standard 
deviation of .451. 
Esmann (1984) hypothesized that an officer's potential for promotion to senior 
ranks was a critical factor in their decision to remain on active duty, and Wielsma(1996) 
found that officers with higher performance evaluation indexes were more likely to 
remain on active duty. Based on this, PINDEX is hypothesized to be positively related to 
an officer's retention to the 0-5 promotion board, since officers with higher fitness report 
marks will have a greater expectation of continued success throughout their careers. 
Estridge (1995) found that, of all factors considered in his models for promotion to 0-4 
and 0-5, his performance evaluation index had the greatest explanatory effect on 
promotion to both ranks. Since fitness reports are the primary source of information 
regarding actual on-the-job performance available to a promotion board, and since 
officers with the strongest fitness reports are the most likely to be promoted, PINDEX 
should be positively related to selection for promotion to 0-5. 
GPA is a continuous variable that reflects an officer's overall grade point average 
at The Basic School (TBS). This variable has a range of 74 to 100 and a mean of 86.78. 
GPA is based on an officer's performance in the first six months of their career when 
every Marine officer, regardless of MOS, receives the firm-specific training that will 
serve as a foundation for their entire Marine Corps career. An officer's GPA at TBS is a 
composite of scores from three evaluation categories: leadership, military skills and 
academics. 
Wielsma (1996) found that officers with higher class standings at TBS were less 
likely to leave active duty prior to the promotion board for 0-4 and more likely to be 
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promoted to 0-4. In addition to measuring actual performance at TBS, GPA also serves 
as an indicator of ability and inclination for the military. Officers who excel early in 
training probably have a natural inclination toward the Marine Corps life and therefore 
are less likely to separate from the Marine Corps and more likely to be selected for 
promotion. 
AWARDS is a continuous variable that measures the number of personal awards 
received by each officer considered by the 0-5 selection board. This variable has a range 
of 0 to 18 and a mean of 4.69. Personal awards are awarded to individual officers who 
distinguish themselves in a given task or billet. Generally, awards are given for effort and 
performance that lie above the realm of expectation or routine. AWARDS provides the 
same weight to a Navy/Marine Corps Achievement Medal as it does to the Navy Cross or 
the Congressional Medal of Honor. A second or third issue of the same award is also 
given the same value as the first award. Estridge (1995) and Grillo (1996) both found that 
officers with greater numbers of personal awards were more likely to be promoted to the 
ranks of 0-4 and 0-5. Since personal awards are issued for performance considered a cut 
above the average, I expect that AWARDS will be positively related to promotion to 0-5. 
PME is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer completed the appropriate- 
level professional military education (PME) to be considered for promotion to the 
following rank. For promotion to the rank of 0-5, the appropriate-level PME is 
considered intermediate-level school, which includes either the resident or non-resident 
courses from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Naval War College 
(Command and Staff), the Air Force Command and Staff College or the Army Command 
and General Staff College. Professional Military Education provides officers with the 
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requisite firm-specific education and training that will enable them to successfully fill a 
variety of billets appropriate for the next rank. Long (1992) found that officers who had 
completed their appropriate level PME were more likely to be promoted to the ranks of 
0-4 through 0-6. In recent years, emphasis on completion of intermediate-level school 
for majors has increased to include indication of automatic exclusion from selection to 0- 
5 if PME has not been completed. I expect the completion of intermediate-level PME will 
be positively related to promotion to 0-5. 
3.        Cognitive Traits 
NPS is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer received a graduate degree 
from the fully-funded program at the Naval Postgraduate School where his primary duty 
was to study a given field. One might expect that the quality of education received in a 
full-time graduate program to be greater than that of a part-time program. Thus, the 
officer with an NPS degree would be more productive than officers without graduate 
degrees or officers with graduate degrees obtained off-duty. From another perspective 
one might expect that an officer who attends NPS spends more time away from his 
"normal" career path, receives unobserved fitness reports while attending NPS, and might 
therefore be less likely to be promoted. Additionally, the specialized skills received at 
NPS and the subsequent "payback" tour might provide less utility to a Marine Corps that 
seeks versatile officers with a broad range of skills. As highlighted in studies by Cymrot 
(1986), Bowman and Mehay (1999) and Estridge (1995), studies of the effects of fully- 
funded graduate education, or NPS specifically on promotion have found a positive 
relationship. However, because of the unique nature of the Marine Corps culture and the 
discussion above, I make no hypothesis regarding the sign of the relationship between 
NPS and retention or promotion. 
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NOT_NPS is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer received a graduate 
degree from sources other than NPS. NOT_NPS includes officers who received graduate 
degrees from intermediate level professional military education (PME) institutions such 
as Marine Corps CSC, Army CGSC, the Naval War College and the Air Command and 
Staff College. However, available data do not allow distinction between various graduate 
education sources other than NPS. While the data are not available to analyze the issue, 
the majority of officers with non-NPS graduate degrees earned them off-duty in part-time 
study via the Tuition Assistance Program. 
Theoretically, officers with graduate degrees from sources other than NPS should 
be more productive than officers without graduate degrees. With the exception of officers 
with graduate degrees from PME institutions, officers with degrees from sources other 
than NPS might not be as productive as officers with NPS degrees since their effort 
toward educational achievement had substantial competition from normal military duties. 
Moreover, off-duty students are not required to study military-specific subjects. On the 
other hand, graduate degrees from PME institutions provide firm-specific education, 
which the Marine Corps may value more than broad-based general education. While the 
studies highlighted in Chapter II either evaluated the effects of graduate degrees from any 
source or the effects of fully-funded graduate degrees only, they did not specifically study 
the effects of non-NPS graduate degrees. Based on the mixed perceptions highlighted in 
Chapter I, I make no hypothesis on the direction of relationships between NOT_NPS and 
retention or promotion to 0-5. 
MASTERS is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer received a graduate 
degree from any source. If NPS or NOT_NPS equals 1, then MASTERS equals 1.   In 
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theory, officers with any graduate degree should be more productive than officers without 
graduate degrees. Bowman and Mehay (1999) found that even after controlling for the 
effects of selection bias, graduate education had a positive impact on the promotion of 
Navy officers to 0-4. Wielsma (1996) found that Marine officers with graduate degrees 
were more likely to remain on active duty until the 0-4 promotion board, but less likely 
to be promoted to 0-4 after controlling for sample selection and self-selection bias. 
Other studies that analyzed the effects of graduate education on promotion of Marine 
officers yielded mixed results. Based on these prior studies and discussion from Chapter 
I, I make no hypothesis regarding the effects of graduate education on retention and 
promotion of Marine officers. 
GCT reflects an officer's score on the General Classification Test. The GCT is 
similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in that it tests mathematical ability and 
reading ability. According to North and Smith (1993), scores on the two tests are highly 
correlated. The GCT also tests an officer's mechanical aptitude. The GCT is traditionally 
used by the military as a measure of mental aptitude upon entrance. Scores can range 
from 0 to 160, with 160 being the highest possible score. The mean GCT score from the 
Accession Cohort Sample is 129.59. 
While North and Smith (1993) found that GCT was not a statistically significant 
factor in explaining promotion to 0-3 or 0-4, Wielsma (1996) and Estridge (1995) found 
that officers with higher GCT scores were less likely to be promoted to 0-4 and 0-5, 
although the difference was not significant. Wielsma (1996) also found that officers with 
higher GCT scores were less likely to hold graduate degrees while holding all else 
constant. Estridge (1995) concluded that GCT was a poor indicator of cognitive ability. 
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For lack of alternative measures of cognitive ability, I use GCT score to explain variance 
in selection for graduate education and promotion to 0-5.1 hypothesize that officers with 
higher GCT scores are more likely to self-select for graduate education and more likely to 
be promoted since they possess greater cognitive abilities. 
4.        Affective Traits 
COMBAT is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer received at least one 
combat fitness report. Combat fitness reports, as opposed to normal fitness reports, are 
written on officers who have served under combat conditions and theoretically faced 
greater conditions of personal stress and physical demand. Officers who prove 
themselves under combat conditions leave little doubt about their true value to a 
warfighting organization like the Marine Corps. 
Wielsma (1996) found that, although officers with combat experience were more 
likely to be promoted to 0-4, the relationship was not statistically significant. Since 
combat experience provides the ultimate in firm-specific training for the Marine Corps, 
and since officers with combat experience are traditionally revered by those without it, I 
expect that COMBAT will be positively related to promotion to 0-5. 
PRIENL is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer spent at least four years on 
active duty as an enlisted person.1 Officers with previous enlisted experience are referred 
to as "mustang" officers in the Marine Corps and traditionally respected for their 
experience and understanding of the enlisted perspective. Additionally, prior enlisted 
1
 The variable PRIENL is based on the rank designator at time of commission and is the most concrete 
measure of enlisted service available for analysis. Officers commissioned as 01 Es served at least 4 years 
on active duty in enlisted status. 
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officers generally have at least four more years of firm-specific training in the military 
establishment than those who joined the Marine Corps as officers. 
Wielsma (1996) found that prior enlisted officers were less likely to be promoted 
to 0-4 but more likely to remain on active duty until the 0-4 board. Prior enlisted officers 
may choose to remain on active duty until the 0-4 point since this milestone could bring 
them closer to the 20 year retirement mark; however, an officer with 4 years of active 
enlisted service prior to commission may be less likely to remain until the 0-5 promotion 
board since they would have met the 20 year mark prior to the board convening and could 
retire with full pension and benefits as an 0-4. Because of their additional firm-specific 
capital and obvious taste for the military, I expect that prior enlisted officers who remain 
to the 0-5 board are more likely to be promoted to 0-5 than officers with direct 
commissions. 
The variables USNA, NROTC and OTHER are all binary variables that reflect an 
officer's source of commission. Officers commissioned from the U.S. Naval Academy 
began receiving firm-specific training and education four years prior to their commission. 
They also survived a rigorous mental, physical and moral screening process throughout 
their time at the Academy as well as during their initial screening for entrance into the 
Academy. Officers commissioned through the NROTC program also received a greater 
level of firm-specific training during college than did those commissioned from other 
sources. Officers commissioned through the USNA or NROTC program demonstrated a 
personal taste for the military as they were more likely to seek out military 
commissioning programs as opposed to being recruited. OTHER refers to officers 
commissioned through the MECEP Program, the Enlisted Commissioning Program 
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(ECP) the Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) and Officer Candidates Class (OCC). These 
officers attended normal civilian colleges at their own expense and received no formal 
military training during their undergraduate schooling with the exception of attending 
Officer Candidates School during the summer. Entrance into these programs is not as 
academically competitive as the entrance into the USNA or NROTC Scholarship 
Programs. 
Studies highlighted in Chapter II provide mixed results regarding the effects of 
USNA, NROTC and OTHER commissioning sources on graduate school completion, 
retention and promotion. Studies by Bowman and Mehay (1999) and Wielsma (1996) are 
consistent in finding that officers from the USNA seem more likely to hold graduate 
degrees than officers from NROTC or other sources. North and Smith (1993), and 
Wielsma (1996) both find that officers from the NROTC Program are more likely to 
remain on active duty until consideration for promotion to 0-4 than officers from the 
USNA or officers from other sources, but Theilmann (1990) and North and Smith (1993) 
both found that USNA graduates were more likely than NROTC officers to remain on 
active duty until consideration for promotion to 0-3. This finding could be due to the 
five-year service obligation for USNA graduates. North and Smith (1993) and Estridge 
(1995) both found that USNA graduates were more likely to be promoted to the rank of 
0-4 than officers from other sources, while Wielsma (1996) found that officers from the 
USNA and NROTC program were less likely to be promoted to 0-4. 
Occupational specialties are categorized by the binary variables CBTARMS, 
SERVICE, SUPPORT, AVIATOR and AVSPPT to reflect the differences across each 
skill group. Table II identifies the MOSs in each occupational category. 
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Officers from different occupational fields face different opportunities within the 
Marine Corps as well as in the civilian labor market and can be expected to behave 
differently. Officers in the CBTARMS and AVIATOR categories constitute the largest 
numbers of general officers and command the warfighting units in the Marine Corps. 
However, the firm-specific training acquired by the combat arms officer has little direct 
value in the civilian market, whereas the general training received by the aviators has 
substantial demand in the civilian market. 
VARIABLE Military Occupational Specialty 
COMBAT INFANTRY (03XX) 
FIELD ARTILLERY (18XX) 
TANKS AND ASSUALT AMPHIBIOUS (18XX) 
SERVICE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (01XX) 
FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING (34XX) 
DATA SYSTEMS (40XX) 
MARINE CORPS EXCHANGE (41XX) 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (43XX) 
LEGAL SERVICES (44XX) 
TRAINING AND AUDIOVISUAL (46XX) 
SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE (02XX) 
LOGISTICS (04XX) 
COMMUNICATIONS (06XX) 
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (26XX) 
SUPPLY (30XX) 
MOTOR TRANSPORT (35XX) 
AWSPPT ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE (59XX) 
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE (60XX) 
ANTI-AIR WARFARE (72XX) 
AVIATOR ALL PILOTS AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS (75XX) 
Table II.        Occupational Category Variables and Associated Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS). 
Officers from the SERVICE category provide general service functions to all 
supporting and operational elements of the Marine Corps and possibly enjoy the least 
glamour. However, officers from the SERVICE category receive general training that is 
valuable in the private sector. Officers from the SUPPORT and AVSPPT MOSs receive a 
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relatively balanced mix of general and firm-specific training in their support role for the 
operational elements of the Marine Corps. The two categories are distinguished by 
AVSPPT officers' specific value to the aviation industry in the private sector. In addition 
to different types and mixes of training, officers from different MOS categories may have 
different tastes and aspirations that led them to choose their occupational fields when 
they entered the Marine Corps. 
While few of the prior studies of retention and promotion of Marine Officers 
yielded statistically significant relationships based on occupational category, both North 
and Smith (1993) and Wielsma (1996) found that aviators were more likely to be 
promoted to the rank of 0-4 than officers from other occupational categories. 
5.        Demographic Traits 
Every study highlighted in Chapter II used a combination of demographic 
variables to explain variation in either promotion rates or retention. The sociological 
norms of the military and the U.S. in general, as well as the structural differences in 
professional opportunities within military all impact the behavior of individuals of 
different age, sex, marital status, dependent status and race. 
COMM_AGE is a continuous variable that reflects an officer's age at the time of 
commission. Officers who are older at the time of commission are perhaps more mature 
and therefore more productive than younger officers, but younger officers may have a 
stronger taste for the military as indicated by entering the military at an earlier age. 
MARSTAT is a binary variable that equals 1 if an officer had ever been married 
as of the last or most recent entry in their official file. DEPEND is a continuous variable 
that reflects the number of dependents each officer had, not including the spouse, as of 
41 
the last or most recent entry in their official file. Research in the field of labor economics 
consistently finds that married people and those with dependents are more productive 
than those who are not married and those without dependents. Married officers and 
officers with dependents may be more likely to remain on active duty because of the job 
security associated with the military. They may be more likely to be promoted than 
unmarried officers and officers without dependents since they have already committed 
themselves to the Marine Corps as their only alternative and the livelihood of their family 
is at stake. Thus, their motivation to perform well is perhaps greater than single officers. 
Bowman and Mehay (1999) and North and Smith (1993) found that married 
officers were more likely to be promoted to the ranks of 0-4 in the Navy and Marine 
Corps, respectively, than officers who were not married. Wielsma (1996) found that after 
controlling for self-selection for graduate education and the retention decision, officers 
who had never been married were more likely to be promoted to 0-4 than officers who 
were or who had been married. North and Smith (1993) and Wielsma (1996) found that 
married officers were more likely to remain on active duty until the 0-4 selection board. 
The variables WHITE, BLACK and 0_RACE are all binary variables that reflect 
an officer's race. The variable 0_RACE reflects any race other than White or Black. 
Race variables are generally included in economic studies to identify whether race based 
differences in promotion or performance exist. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. military 
has been under increasing pressure to explain variation in retention and promotion rates 
of the different races. While all of the prior studies highlighted in Chapter II included 
race variables, only North and Smith (1993) found that minority status had a significant 
impact on promotion to 0-3, and Thielmann (1990) found that minority officers were 
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more likely to remain on active duty at the rank of 0-3 than non-minorities. No other 
study provided convincing evidence of systematic difference in retention or promotion 
rates based on race. 
6.        Career Traits 
Career traits address timing of various events during an officer's career. U_RATE 
is a continuous variable that reflects the national unemployment rate of adults over the 
age of 16 in managerial and professional specialty occupations in the year in which an 
officer completed his initial service obligation. U_RATE represents the national 
unemployment rate at an officer's first career stay-leave decision and is based on the 
following contract lengths: 5 years for USNA, 4 years for NROTC, 3 years of all other 
accession sources and 6 years for aviators from any accession source. UJRATE has a 
range of 1.8 to 3.1 percent and a mean of 2.32 percent. Wielsma (1996) and Esmann 
(1984) found both found that officers were more likely to separate from active duty in 
years with lower national unemployment rates. 
The variables FY1998, FY1999, FY2000 and FY2001 are all binary variables that 
reflect which particular year an officer was considered in the primary zone for promotion 
to 0-5. Because the Marine Corps promotes to fill vacancies, promotion opportunities 
vary due to availability of vacancies in the higher grades. Individual promotion boards 
also have different precepts that must be held constant in order to isolate the effects of the 
other explanatory variables. 
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IV.    PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
A.       THE ACCESSION COHORT SAMPLE 
Before developing multivariate models to estimate the effects of graduate 
education on retention and promotion of Marine officers, we must first draw insight from 
the descriptive statistics of the Accession Cohort Sample. 
Table III provides number of observations and frequency for categorical 
variables, and the mean (or percentage), and standard deviation for all of the analysis 
variables. The cohort contains 6,507 initial members. The variable SURVIVE has a mean 
value of .25. For binary variables such as SURVIVE, the mean value indicates the 
percentage of total observations for which the variable has a value of 1. Hence, only 25 
percent of the officers in the Accession Cohort Sample survived on active duty long 
enough to be considered for promotion to 0-5. Note that the 0-5 promotion board occurs 
at roughly 16 years of service. Of the 1,627 officers who survived to the 0-5 board, 68.2 
percent were actually selected. The mean PINDEX of 8.56 on a range of 0 to 9 indicates 
a highly inflated performance evaluation system. Regarding graduate education, 19.5 
percent of the officers received graduate degrees from any source at some time; 4.7 
percent received their degrees from NPS while 14.8 percent received graduate degrees 
from sources other than NPS. 
Nearly 75 percent of the officers in the Accession Cohort Sample were 
commissioned through programs other than the Naval Academy or NROTC. 
Approximately 75 percent of the officers were married at some point in their careers. 
Over 96 percent of the officers were male and over 93 percent were of the white race. 
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Table IV compares the mean values for each independent variable of the 
Accession Cohort Sample for two groups: those officers who stayed on active duty long 
enough to be considered for promotion to 0-5 and those who left prior to the 0-5 
promotion point. Of those who did not stay, only those with prior enlisted experience (6 
percent) would have been eligible to retire. The t-statistic tests whether the mean of each 
variable differs between the two groups. 
For example, officers who stayed to the 0-5 promotion board had a mean 
performance evaluation index (PINDEX) of 8.84, whereas officers who did not stay had a 
mean performance evaluation index of 8.47. This difference, although small, is 
statistically significant because the standard deviation in Table III indicates the variation 
around the mean is small. 
Of officers who survived to the 0-5 promotion point, 52.7 percent had a master's 
degree (MASTERS) from any source; conversely, only 8.4 percent of officers who did 
not survive had a master's degree.  Note this suggests that getting a master's does not 
lead to an officer leaving the Marine Corps (to the extent cause and effect run in this 
direction). Based on the significant differences in Table IV, one can make the following 
characterizations of officers who stayed until the 0-5 board compared to officers who did 
not survive: 
Survivors had higher performance indexes 
Survivors were more likely to hold a graduate degree from any source 
Survivors had higher GPAs at TBS 
Survivors were more likely to have previous enlisted active duty service. 
Survivors were more likely to have combat experience 
Survivors were more likely to be married 
Survivors had a greater number of dependents 
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Variable N Frequency Mean or Percent Std Dev 
SURVIVE 6507 1627 0.2500384 0.4330682 
SELECT 1627 1110 0.6822372 0.4655087 
PINDEX 6507 8.5664845 0.4512333 
GPA 6507 86.7863839 3.6548162 
MAJOR 6507 2192 0.336868 0.4726757 
NPS 6507 306 0.0470263 0.2117114 
NOT NPS 6507 965 0.1483018 0.3554262 
MASTERS 6507 1271 0.1953281 0.3964835 
GCT 6507 129.5935147 10.398617 
COMBAT 6507 1362 0.209313 0.4068495 
PRIENL 6507 407 0.062548 0.2421668 
USNA 6507 702 0.1078838 0.3102575 
NROTC 6507 1104 0.1696634 0.3753657 
OTHER 6507 4701 0.7224527 0.4478232 
CBTARMS 6507 1715 0.2635623 0.4405985 
SERVICE 6507 542 0.0832949 0.2763487 
SUPPORT 6507 1718 0.2640234 0.4408457 
AVIATOR 6507 2088 0.3208852 0.4668526 
AVSPPT 6507 443 0.0680805 0.2519034 
COMM AGE 6507 22.9403719 1.8080695 
MARSTAT 6507 4863 0.747349 0.4345659 
DEPEND 6507 1.8161979 1.6203712 
SEX 6507 6251 0.9606578 0.1944228 
WHITE 6507 6109 0.9388351 0.239651 
BLACK 6507 287 0.0441063 0.2053472 
0 RACE 6507 111 0.0170586 0.1294996 
U RATE 6507 2.4592132 0.3630098 
Table III.      Descriptive Statistics for the Accession Cohort Sample. 
Table V compares mean values of each independent variable of the Accession 
Cohort Sample for two groups: officers who had graduate degrees from any source 
(MASTERS) and those with no graduate degree at all. Officers with graduate degrees 
survived at a 68 percent rate versus only a 14.6 percent survival rate for those without 
graduate degrees. Officers with graduate degrees had higher performance evaluation 
indexes, higher GPAs at TBS and higher GCT scores compared to officers without 
degrees. Graduate degree holders are more often commissioned via the USNA or 
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NROTC. In fact, the two groups differ with respect to all variables in Table V except 
O RACE. 
VARIABLE 





PINDEX 8.4731 8.8467 -50.22** 
NPS 0.0199 0.1285 -12.72** 
NOT NPS 0.0648 0.3989 -26.43** 
MASTERS 0.0846 0.5274 -34.04** 
GPA 86.332 88.151 -18.19** 
GCT 129.51 129.84 -1.13 
COMBAT 0.1547 0.3731 -16.72** 
PPvIENL 0.0582 0.0756 -2.36* 
USNA 0.1049 0.1168 -1.3 
NROTC 0.1643 0.1856 -1.93 
OTHER 0.7307 0.6976 2.54* 
CBTARMS 0.2697 0.2452 1.97* 
SERVICE 0.0861 0.075 1.45 
SUPPORT 0.2633 0.2661 -0.22 
AVIATOR 0.3156 0.3368 -1.58 
AVSPPT 0.0652 0.0768 -1.62 
COMM AGE 22.933 22.964 -0.6 
MARSTAT 0.6752 0.9637 -24.21** 
DEPEND 1.4492 2.917 -35.36** 
SEX 0.9582 0.968 -1.89 
WHITE 0.9338 0.9539 _3 i9** 
BLACK 0.0482 0.032 3.04** 
0 RACE 0.018 0.0141 1.12 
** Statistically significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level 
Table IV.       Mean Value of Independent Variables of the Accession Cohort 
Sample by SURVIVE. 
Table VI (columns 1-3) compares mean values for each variable for two groups: 
officers with graduate degrees from NPS and those without any graduate degree. Officers 
with graduate degrees from NPS survived at a 68 percent rate versus a 14.7 percent 
survival rate for those without graduate degrees. Officers with NPS degrees had higher 
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performance evaluation indexes, higher GPAs at TBS and higher GCT scores. Those who 
attend NPS were more likely to be commissioned via the USNA or NROTC. 
Variable 






SURVIVE 0.1469 0.6751** -37.67** 
PINDEX 8.5097 8.8004** -31.94** 
GPA 86.443 88.202** -15.57** 
GCT 129.12 131.55** -7.36** 
COMBAT 0.1887 0.2943** -7.6** 
PPJENL 0.0512 0.1094** -6.27** 
USNA 0.0978 0.1495** -4.78** 
NROTC 0.1631 0.1967** -2.74** 
OTHER 0.7391 0.6538** 5.82** 
CBTARMS 0.2689 0.2415* 2.03* 
SERVICE 0.067 0.1503** -7.85** 
SUPPORT 0.2574 0.2911* -2.39* 
AVIATOR 0.343 0.2297** 8.39** 
AVSPPT 0.0634 0.0873** -2.78** 
COMM AGE 22.882 23.183** -4.73** 
MARSTAT 0.7024 0.9323** -24.29** 
DEPEND 1.5982 2.7144** -22.78** 
SEX 0.965 0.9426** 3.21** 
WHITE 0.9351 0.9544** -2.85** 
BLACK 0.0466 0.0338* 2.18* 
0 RACE 0.0183 0.0118 1.84 
** Statistically significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level 
Table V. Mean Values of Independent Variables of the Accession Cohort 
Sample by MASTERS. 
Table VI also compares mean values for officers with graduate degrees from 
sources other than NPS with officers without graduate degrees (columns 4-6). Officers 
with degrees from sources other than NPS survived at a higher rate than those with no 
graduate degree at all. Those with degrees from sources other than NPS had higher mean 
scores on the same measured performance traits - PINDEX, GPA and GCT. 
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VARIABLE 
GRADUATE DEGREE FROM 
NPS 
GRADUATE DEGREE 









SURVIVE 0.1469 0.683 -25.25** 0.1469 0.6725 -33.09** 
PINDEX 8.5097 8.8541 -37.63** 8.5097 8.7834 -26.47** 
GPA 86.443 88.918 -12.85** 86.443 87.975 -11.87** 
GCT 129.12 135.41 -10.19** 129.12 130.32 -3.32** 
COMBAT 0.1887 0.1863 0.11 0.1887 0.3285 -8.70** 
PPJENL 0.0512 0.1569 -5.02** 0.0512 0.0943 -4.36** 
USNA 0.0978 0.2614 -6.42** 0.0978 0.114 -1.47 
NROTC 0.1631 0.2059 -1.80 0.1631 0.1938 -2.24* 
OTHER 0.7391 0.5327 7.07** 0.7391 0.6922 2 92** 
CBTARMS 0.2689 0.1993 2.94** 0.2689 0.2549 0.91 
SERVICE 0.067 0.1536 _4 i4** 0.067 0.1492 -6.86** 
SUPPORT 0.2574 0.3693 -3.95** 0.2574 0.2663 -0.57 
AVIATOR 0.343 0.1601 8.31** 0.343 0.2518 5.91** 
AVSPPT 0.0634 0.1176 -2.89** 0.0634 0.0777 -1.55 
COMM AGE 22.882 23.013 -1.12 22.882 23.236 -4.89** 
MARSTAT 0.7024 0.9771 -25.82** 0.7024 0.9181 -19.86** 
DEPEND 1.5982 3.0784 -15.84** 1.5982 2.599 -18.46** 
SEX 0.965 0.9641 0.09 0.965 0.9358 3.53 
WHITE 0.9351 0.951 -1.24 0.9351 0.9554 -2.73** 
BLACK 0.0466 0.0294 1.70 0.0466 0.0352 1.72 
0 RACE 0.0183 0.0196 -0.16 0.0183 0.0093 2.50* 
** Statistically significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically Significant at the .05 level 
Table VI.       Mean Values of Independent Variables of the Accession Cohort 
Sample by NPS and by NOT_NPS. 
B.        THE PROMOTION SAMPLE 
Table VII provides descriptive statistics for officers from the Promotion Sample. 
Of the 1,627 officers who stayed in the Marine Corps and were considered for promotion 
to 0-5, 68.2 percent were selected, 52.7 percent had graduate degrees from any source, 
12.8 percent had graduate degrees from NPS and 39.8 percent had graduate degrees from 
sources other than NPS. 
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Variable N Mean Std Dev 
SELECT 1627 0.6822372 0.4657498 
PINDEX 1627 8.8467039 0.1121409 
GPA 1627 88.1505839 3.4552229 
AWARDS 1627 4.6982176 2.4695968 
PME 1627 0.6127843 0.4872634 
NPS 1627 0.1284573 0.3347012 
NOT NPS 1627 0.3988937 0.4898214 
MASTERS 1627 0.527351 0.4994049 
GCT 1627 129.8389674 10.0199005 
COMBAT 1627 0.3730793 0.4837716 
PRIENL 1627 0.0755993 0.2644371 
USNA 1627 0.1167793 0.3212559 
NROTC 1627 0.1856177 0.3889174 
OTHER 1627 0.697603 0.4594375 
CBTARMS 1627 0.2452366 0.4303597 
SERVICE 1627 0.0749846 0.2634475 
SUPPORT 1627 0.266134 0.442071 
AVIATOR 1627 0.3368162 0.4727668 
AVSPPT 1627 0.0768285 0.266401 
COMM AGE 1627 22.9637369 1.8592643 
MARSTAT 1627 0.9637369 0.1870015 
DEPEND 1627 2.9170252 1.4293098 
SEX 1627 0.9680393 0.1759494 
BLACK 1627 0.0319607 0.1759494 
0 RACE 1627 0.0141364 0.1180897 
FY1998 1627 0.2421635 0.4285244 
FY1999 1627 0.2083589 0.4062597 
FY2000 1627 0.3171481 0.4655087 
FY2001 1627 0.2323294 0.4224478 
Table VII.      Descriptive Statistics for the Promotion Sample. 
Table VIII compares mean values of each independent variable of the Promotion 
Sample for two groups: officers who were selected for promotion to 0-5 and those who 
were not selected. The following characterizations can be drawn regarding officers who 
were selected for promotion to 0-5 compared to those where were not selected: 
Selectees had a higher early performance evaluation index 
Selectees had a higher GPA at TBS 
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Selectees had a greater number of personal awards 
Selectees were more likely to have completed intermediate-level PME 
Selectees were equally likely to have an NPS degree 
Selectees were more likely to hold graduate degrees from sources other 
than NPS 
Selectees were more likely to hold graduate degrees from any source 
Table IX compares mean values of each independent variable of the Promotion 
Sample for two groups: officers who hold graduate degrees from any source and those 
who do not hold a graduate degree at all. Officers who hold a graduate degree were 
selected for 0-5 at a 77.4 percent rate, versus a 58.0 percent promotion rate for those 
without a graduate degree. Officers with graduate degrees had superior means on all 
performance traits including completion of PME. 
Table X (Columns 1-3) compares mean values of each variable of the Promotion 
Sample for two groups: officers who hold graduate degrees from NPS and those without 
a graduate degree at all. Officers with NPS degrees were selected for promotion at rate of 
67.9 percent versus a 58.0 percent selection rate for those without graduate degrees. 
Officers who had NPS degrees had higher performance evaluation indexes and GPAs at 
TBS, although they had fewer personal awards and were less likely to have completed 
their PME. 
Table X (columns 4-6) also compares mean values of each variable for officers 
with graduate degrees from sources other than NPS and those with no graduate degree at 
all. Officers with non-NPS graduate degrees were selected for promotion to 0-5 at a rate 
of 80.4 percent versus a rate the 58 percent for officers without a graduate degree at all. 
Officers with non-NPS graduate degrees had higher performance evaluation indexes, 
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higher GPAs at TBS, had more personal awards and were more likely to have completed 
their PME compared to those with no degree. 
Variable 





PINDEX 8.8077 8.8649 -9.3** 
GPA 87.509 88.45 -5.07** 
AWARDS 4.0193 5.0144 -8.21** 
PME 0.3907 0.7162 -12.82** 
NPS 0.1296 0.1279 0.09 
NOT NPS 0.2456 0.4703 -9 3** 
MASTERS 0.3752 0.5982 -8.61** 
GCT 129.45 130.02 -1.11 
COMBAT 0.352 0.3829 -1.21 
PRIENL 0.0948 0.0667 1.89 
USNA 0.1044 0.1225 -1.08 
NROTC 0.1915 0.1829 0.41 
OTHER 0.7041 0.6946 0.39 
CBTARMS 0.2553 0.2405 0.64 
SERVICE 0.0832 0.0712 0.83 
SUPPORT 0.3211 0.2405 3.32** 
AVIATOR 0.2863 0.3604 -3.02** 
AVSPPT 0.0542 0.0874 -2.54* 
COMM AGE 23.217 22.846 3.68 
MARSTAT 0.9574 0.9667 -0.89 
DEPEND 2.8917 2.9288 -0.48 
SEX 0.9787 0.9631 1.84 
WHITE 0.942 0.9595 -1.47 
BLACK 0.0406 0.0279 1.27 
0 RACE 0.0174 0.0126 0.72 
FY1998 0.236 0.245 -0.4 
FY1999 0.2012 0.2117 -0.49 
FY2000 0.3075 0.3216 -0.57 
FY2001 0.2553 0.2216 1.47 
** Statistically Significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically Significant at the .05 level 














SELECT 0.58 0.7739 -8.49** 
PINDEX 8.8329 8.8591 -4 74** 
GPA 87.701 88.554 -5.00** 
AWARDS 4.4889 4.8858 -3.26** 
PME 0.5046 0.7098 -8.63** 
NPS 0 0.2436 -16.61** 
NOT NPS 0 0.7564 -51.59** 
GCT 128.67 130.89 -4.51** 
COMBAT 0.3992 0.3497 2.06* 
PRIENL 0.0689 0.0816 -0.97 
USNA 0.091 0.1399 -3 1** 
NROTC 0.1691 0.2005 -1.63 
OTHER 0.7399 0.6597 3.54 
CBTARMS 0.2315 0.2576 -1.22 
SERVICE 0.0572 0.0909 -2.61** 
SUPPORT 0.2406 0.289 -2.22* 
AVIATOR 0.407 0.2739 5.7** 
AVSPPT 0.0637 0.0886 -1.9 
COMM AGE 22.979 22.95 0.32 
MARSTAT 0.9532 0.9732 -2.13* 
DEPEND 2.9233 2.9114 0.17 
SEX 0.974 0.9627 1.3 
WHITE 0.9441 0.9627 -1.77 
BLACK 0.0377 0.0268 1.24 
0 RACE 0.0182 0.0105 1.3 
** Statistically Significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically Significant at the .05 level 
Table IX.       Mean Values of Independent Variables of the Promotion Sample by 
MASTERS. 
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Graduate Degree From NPS 











SELECT 0.58 0.6794 -2.69** 0.58 0.8043 -9.56** 
PINDEX 8.8329 8.8682 _4 44** 8.8329 8.8561 -3.38** 
GPA 87.701 88.722 -4.05** 87.701 88.499 -4.32** 
AWARDS 4.4889 4.1292 2.19* 4.4889 5.1294 -4.76** 
PME 0.5046 0.4833 0.55 0.5046 0.7827 -11.47** 
GCT 128.67 134.06 -6.74** 128.67 129.87 -2.28* 
COMBAT 0.3992 0.2153 5.48** 0.3992 0.3929 0.24 
PRIENL 0.0689 0.0957 -1.20 0.0689 0.077 -0.58 
USNA 0.091 0.2584 -5.22** 0.091 0.1017 -0.68 
NROTC 0.1691 0.2249 -1.75 0.1691 0.1926 -1.15 
OTHER 0.7399 0.5167 5.86** 0.7399 0.7057 1.43 
CBTARMS 0.2315 0.1962 1.12 0.2315 0.2773 -1.97* 
SERVICE 0.0572 0.1292 -2.91** 0.0572 0.0786 -1.58 
SUPPORT 0.2406 0.3732 _3 59** 0.2406 0.2619 -0.92 
AVIATOR 0.407 0.1866 6.82** 0.407 0.302 4.15** 
AVSPPT 0.0637 0.1148 -2.15* 0.0637 0.0801 -1.19 
COMM AGE 22.979 22.775 1.45 22.979 23.006 -0.27 
MARSTAT 0.9532 0.9761 -1.75 0.9532 0.9723 -1.91 
DEPEND 2.9233 3.0144 -0.79 2.9233 2.8783 0.60 
SEX 0.974 0.9665 0.55 0.974 0.9615 1.32 
WHITE 0.9441 0.9569 -0.79 0.9441 0.9646 -1.86 
BLACK 0.0377 0.0287 0.67 0.0377 0.0262 1.24 
0 RACE 0.0182 0.0144 0.40 0.0182 0.0092 1.47 
** Statistically Significant at the .01 level 
* Statistically Significant at the .05 level 
Table X. Mean Values of Independent Variables of the Promotion Sample by 
NPS and NOT_NPS. 
C.       SUMMARY 
Preliminary analysis of the descriptive statistics provided in this Chapter gives 
some indication that the expected relationships regarding the effects of graduate 
education on retention and promotion of Marine officers will be supported in the 
multivariate models. Officers with graduate degrees from any source were more likely to 
survive to the 0-5 promotion board and more likely to be promoted than officers without 
graduate degrees. Officers with NPS degrees were more likely to survive and be 
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promoted to 0-5 than officers without graduate degrees. Officers with graduate degrees 
from sources other than NPS were more likely to survive and be promoted than officers 
with no graduate degree at all. Based on this preliminary analysis, no inferences can be 
drawn from direct comparisons between officers with NPS degrees and those with 
graduate degrees from other sources. 
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V.      MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Multivariate modeling allows for the isolation of the effects of a given 
explanatory variable while holding the effects of other explanatory variables constant. 
The most common method of multivariate analysis is ordinary least squares (OLS), 
which is most often used to explain variance of a continuous explanatory variable. The 
use of OLS to estimate models with a binary (0,1) dependent variable is referred to as a 
linear probability model (LPM). This model is inherently flawed as it uses a linear 
functional form to explain a non-linear function. This thesis will use the probit model for 
a binary outcome that uses a continuous probability distribution to predict the probability 
that a binary dependent variable has a value of 1. Since this thesis analyzes the binary 
outcomes of retention to the 0-5 promotion point (SURVIVE) and selection for 
promotion to 0-5 (SELECT), the probit model is appropriate. (North and Smith 1993) 
A.       MODELING FOR RETENTION 
Initial analysis of the Accession Cohort Sample uses a simple probit model to 
estimate the effects of graduate education on the retention of Marine Officers to the 0-5 
promotion point. Table XI provides the results of these initial models. The binary 
dependent variable SURVIVE reflects whether or not an officer in an initial entry cohort 
remained on active duty until the 0-5 promotion point (roughly 16 years). Model 1 
includes MASTERS as the graduate education variable and Model 2 distinguishes 
between graduate degrees from NPS and those received from sources other than NPS 
(NOT_NPS). 
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These models reflect OTHER as the omitted accession source and CBTARMS as 
the omitted MOS category. Model 1 compares MASTERS to no graduate degree at all 
and Model 2 compares both NPS and NOT_NPS to no graduate degree at all. 
The log-likelihood ratio test provides one measure of goodness of fit for models 
with binary dependent variables. It tests the null hypothesis that the set of explanatory 
variables does not explain any of the variation in the dependent variable. In the case of 
Models 1 and 2 the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the set of explanatory variables does 
provide some explanatory power. Another measure of goodness of fit is an assessment of 
Model 1 Mode 2 
Coeff. StdErr. Coeff. Std.Err. 
INTERCEPT -36.3731** 1.5592 -36.5129** 1.5627 
PINDEX 3.9138** 0.1705 3.9263** 0.1708 
GPA 0.0023 0.0068 0.0028 0.0068 
MASTERS 1.0531** 




NOT.NPS 1.0948** M2451 
0.0567 
COMBAT 0.5102** 0.0498 0.5047** 0.0500 
PRIENL -0.3667** 0.0966 -0.3571** 0.0968 
USNA -0.1866* 0.0758 -0.1735* 0.0760 
NROTC -0.0007 0.0648 0.0008 0.0648 
SERVICE -0.2179* 0.0927 -0.2151* 0.0927 
SUPPORT 0.1281* 0.0651 0.1347* 0.0652 
AVIATOR 0.2110** 0.0677 0.2088** 0.0678 
AVSPPT 0.0527 0.0985 0.0600 0.0986 
COMM AGE -0.0156 0.0147 -0.0166 0.0147 
MARSTAT 0.5782** 0.0895 0.5787** 0.0895 
DEPEND 0.1739** 0.0160 0.1752** 0.0160 
SEX -0.3284** 0.1228 -0.3209** 0.1228 
U RATE 0.2733** 0.0762 0.2697** 0.0762 
N 6507 6507 
-2Log L 4134.568 4131.418 
* * Significant at the .01 le 
* Significant at the .05 le 




Table XI.       Simple Probit Models for SURVIVE. 
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the predictive accuracy of a model. Model 1 predicts with 86.6 percent accuracy whether 
or not an officer remained on active duty until the 0-5 promotion point. Model 2 predicts 
results with 86.5 percent accuracy. A third measure of goodness of fit is an assessment of 
whether the signs and significance of the explanatory variables fit with hypothesized 
relationships. 
The results of models 1 and 2 indicate that officers with graduate degrees from 
any source, NPS degrees and degrees from sources other than NPS are all more likely to 
survive than officers without any graduate degree at all. The marginal effects indicate the 
percentage difference in survival rates while holding all other explanatory variables at 
their mean values. Thus, an officer with a graduate degree from any source (MASTERS) 
is 12 percentage points more likely to survive than an officer without a graduate degree. 
Officers with graduate degrees from NPS are 10.5 percentage points more likely to 
survive than officers without graduate degrees. Those with degrees from sources other 
than NPS are 12.4 percentage points more likely to survive than officers without graduate 
degrees. The relative comparison of both NPS and NOT_NPS to officers without any 
graduate degree indicates that graduate education from sources other than NPS provides a 
greater effect on retention to the 0-5 promotion point than graduate education from NPS. 
One should note however, that the non-NPS category includes graduates of the 
intermediate-level service schools. 
Results from Models 1 and 2 indicate that officers with a higher performance 
index (PINDEX) and more dependents are more likely to survive until the 0-5 promotion 
point. Officers with combat experience, aviators and officers who had been married are 
59 
more likely to survive to the 0-5 promotion point whereas officers with active-duty 
enlisted experience and males are less likely to survive. 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter II, the sign and statistical significance 
of all of the explanatory variables seem within reason with the possible exception of 
SEX. After controlling for females' lower performance evaluation indexes and fewer 
numbers of personal awards, females appear more likely to survive to the 0-5 promotion 
point. It should be noted however, that only 256 (roughly 3 percent) of the 6,507 officers 
in the Accession Cohort Sample are female. 
B.        PROMOTION MODELS 
The predicted probability of promotion from the Promotion Sample of 1,627 
officers is estimated with the simple probit model. The non-linear probit model imposes 
the restriction that the dependent variable SELECT is bounded by 0 and 1. 
Table XII presents the results of alternative specifications of the SELECT model. 
Models 3 through 5 are estimated with an increasing number of performance indicators in 
order to evaluate the robustness of the coefficients of the graduate education variables; 
Model 3 contains none of the performance measures; Model 4 includes AWARDS and 
PME; Model 5 includes AWARDS, PME and PINDEX. 
The results of Model 3 indicate that officers with graduate degrees from any 
source, aviators and those who were younger at time of commissioning are more likely to 
be promoted to 0-5. According to Model 3, an officer's sex was not a significant factor in 
promotion to 0-5. The marginal effect of MASTERS indicates that officers with graduate 
education are 21.5 percentage points more likely to be promoted than an officer without a 
graduate degree. 
60 
After adding the performance measures PINDEX, AWARDS and PME in Model 
5, the marginal effect of having a graduate degree from any source (MASTERS) 
decreases from .2157 to .1504. The reduction of the marginal effect of MASTERS is 
consistent with the notion that its effect was over-stated when the variables AWARDS, 
PME and PINDEX were omitted. This marginal effect of .1504 indicates that an officer 
with a graduate degree from any source is 15.04 percentage points more likely to be 
selected for promotion to 0-5 than an officer without a graduate degree. Since the overall 
promotion rate is .68, a 15 percentage point difference represents a 22 percent promotion 
advantage for degree holders. Model 5 will serve as the basic structural model for 
promotion to 0-5 (SELECT) throughout the rest of this thesis. 
The results of Model 5 indicate that officers who have a higher performance 
index, a greater number of personal awards, completed their intermediate-level PME, are 
younger at the time of commissioning and female are more likely to be selected for 
promotion to 0-5. The results also indicate that aviators and those from aviation support 
MOSs are more likely to be promoted than those from combat arms MOSs. Note that 
after controlling for performance evaluation index, number of personal awards and PME 
completion, the effect of being female becomes significant. These results are all 
consistent with previous research and support the a priori hypotheses. 
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Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. StdErr. 
INTERCEPT 2.3221** 0.5925 1.1495** 0.6231 -21.5945** 2.8319 -21.7892** 2.8342 
PINDEX 2.6019** 0.3158 2.6288** 0.3162 
AWARDS 0.1051** 0.0166 0.0995** 0.017 0.0975** 0.0171 
















COMBAT 0.0916 0.0708 -0.1003 0.0772 -0.0573 0.0788 -0.0616 0.079 
PRIENL 0.0119 0.1451 -0.0154 0.1505 -0.0197 0.1534 -0.0052 
0.1539 
USNA -0.1271 0.1113 -0.0424 0.1152 -0.0677 0.117 -0.0393 
0.1186 
NROTC -0.1788 0.0932 -0.1451 0.0976 -0.1042 0.0998 -0.0982 
0.1 
SERVICE -0.1577 0.1414 -0.0381 0.1457 0.0288 0.1484 0.042 
0.1487 
SUPPORT -0.1797 0.0928 -0.0942 0.0964 -0.001 0.099 0.0126 
0.0995 
AVIATOR 0.2402** 0.0913 0.3708** 0.0963 0.4702** 0.0991 0.4685** 
0.0992 
AVSPPT 0.2675 0.1453 0.3622* 0.1512 0.3820* 0.1531 0.3923* 
0.1532 
COMM_AG 
E -.0783** 0.0219 -0.0623* 0.0228 -0.0700** 0.0233 -0.0721** 0.0234 
MARSTAT 0.1049 0.1885 -0.0029 0.1973 0.052 0.2011 0.0509 0.201 
DEPEND 0.0073 0.0255 0.0230 0.0263 0.0123 0.0269 _, 0.0125 0.0269 
SEX -0.5083* 0.2153 -0.4768* 0.2219 -0.6214** 0.2273 -0.6067** 
0.2273 
N 1627 1627 1627 1627 




Tiificant at Ö 
aificant at th 
inal Effect h 
ie .01 level 
e .05 level 
a brackets 
Table XII.      Simple Probit Models for SELECT 
Measures of goodness of fit for Model 5 indicate that the model is reasonably 
valid. The log-likelihood ratio (LLR) test indicates that the set of explanatory variables 
does explain some of the variation in selection to 0-5. Also, the model correctly predicts 
selection to 0-5 with 74 percent accuracy. 
Model 6 contains the same set of explanatory variables as Model 5 although the 
variable MASTERS (master's degree from any source) is replaced by the variables NPS 
and NOT_NPS to evaluate differences in the effects of graduate degrees from NPS versus 
from sources other than NPS. The marginal effect of NPS is .1065 and the marginal 
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effect of NOT_NPS is .1674. The difference in these marginal effects indicates that 
graduate degrees from sources other than NPS have a larger effect on promotion to 0-5 
than graduate degrees from NPS. This outcome is not surprising considering officers who 
attend NPS typically leave their normal career paths for approximately six years and 
receive not-observed performance evaluations while attending NPS. Additionally, the 
variable NOTJSTPS is also representative of officers who received their graduate 
education from intermediate-level PME schools, which are quite selective in their own 
right. Completion of either resident or non-resident PME is considered essential for 
promotion to 0-5. 
Table XIII includes alternative specifications of the SELECT model, which 
modify the basic structure of Model 5 and allow for testing of the following null 
hypotheses: 
• There is no difference in selection rates across various fiscal year 
promotion boards. 
• The return to graduate education did not change between the FY1998 
through FY2001 0-5 promotion boards. 
Model 7 includes the variables FY1999, FY2000 and FY2001 to test the first null 
hypothesis (FY1998 is the omitted category). Using the LLR test, Model 5 serves as the 
restricted model and Model 8 serves as the unrestricted model. The following equation is 
used to determine the chi square statistic (A,) for the LLR test: 
X= [-2Log L (Restricted)]-[-2Log L (Unrestricted)] 
At the 95 percent confidence level, the critical test statistic is 7.81 (Chi-Square, 3 
df). In this case, X = 2.34 and the first null hypothesis is accepted: There is no significant 
difference in promotion rates across fiscal years. 
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Model 8 includes the interaction variables MASTERS*FY1999, 
MASTERS*FY2000 and MASTERS*FY2001 to test the second null hypothesis 
(MASTERS*FY1998 is the omitted case). Model 5 serves as the restricted model and 
Model 8 as the unrestricted model. The log likelihood ratio test yields a chi-square 
statistic (A, of-.0184. At the 95 percent confidence level, the critical test statistic is 7.81 
(chi-square, 3 df). Thus, the second null hypothesis is also accepted: the effect of a 
master's degree on promotion does not vary across fiscal years. 
C.       MODELING SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
Since the Promotion Sample contains observations of officers who were not 
randomly selected into the sample, those officers likely possess unobserved 
characteristics that predict both the likelihood of survival until the 0-5 promotion point 
and promotion to 0-5. These unobserved factors could potentially bias the coefficients of 
the graduate education variables in Models 5 and 6 (as well as the coefficients of other 
variables). 
1.        Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection 
When analyzing the effects of various accession characteristics on promotion to 
the ranks of captain and major, North and Smith (1993) found that the results of their 
simple probit models for promotion were affected by sample selection bias since those 
considered for promotion must have first remained on active duty until the promotion 
point in question. North and Smith (1993) used the bivariate Probit model with sample 
selection to correct for this bias. 
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VARIABLES 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Coeff. StdErr. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 
INTERCEPT -22.0025** 2.9069 -22.0594** 2.8880 -21.7797** 2.8655 
PINDEX 2.6555** 0.3268 2.6589** 0.3226 2.5992** 0.316 
AWARDS 0.0984** 0.0171 0.0984** 0.0171 0.1000** 0.017 








GCT 0.0016 0.0037 
COMBAT -0.0544 0.0791 -0.0565 0.0790 -0.0572 0.0788 
PRIENL -0.0139 0.1534 -0.0173 0.1535 -0.0235 0.1537 
USNA -0.0708 0.1175 -0.0681 0.1171 -0.0779 0.1193 
NROTC -0.1013 0.0999 -0.1024 0.0999 -0.1114 0.1012 
SERVICE 0.0314 0.1485 0.0295 0.1487 0.0278 0.1485 
SUPPORT -0.0027 0.0993 -0.0056 0.0991 0.0005 0.0991 
AVIATOR 0.4741** 0.0994 0.4675** 0.0994 0.4669** 0.0994 
AVSPPT 0.3832* 0.1533 0.3819* 0.1532 0.3836* 0.1532 
COMM AGE -0.0711** 0.0234 -0.0708** 0.0234 -0.0697** 0.0234 
MARSTAT 0.0459 0.2009 0.0457 0.2012 0.0485 0.2013 
DEPEND 0.0126 0.0269 0.0134 0.0269 0.0122 0.0269 
SEX -0.6238** 0.2274 -0.6317** 0.2280 -0.6240** 0.2275 
FY1999 -0.0019 0.1074 
FY2000 hO.0192 0.0987   
FY2001 -0.0867 0.107 
MAST*FY1999 0.0151 0.1528 
MAST*FY2000 -0.0531 0.1411 
MAST*FY2001 -0.1593 0.1533 
N 1627 1627 1627 
-2Log L 1674.674 1677.0364 1676.828 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Marginal Effect in brackets 
Table XIII.    Alternative Simple Probit Models for SELECT. 
In order to control for those unobserved factors that predict both retention until 
the 0-5 promotion point and promotion to 0-5, this thesis also uses the bivariate probit 
with sample selection technique to estimate the joint probability of retention and 
promotion to 0-5. This technique requires the joint estimation of a selection model 
(Model 1) and an outcome model (Model 5) and controls for the covariance of the error 
terms in both models. Model 1 contains the variable U RATE, which serves as an 
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instrumental variable that is related to survival but not related to selection for promotion 
to 0-5. The basic model is as follows (North and Smith 1993, 32): 
yii = ßiXii + en, (1) 
yi2 = p2Xi2 + £12, (2) 
61,62 ~BVN(0,0,1,1,P), 
(yu,Xii) is observed only when yi2 =1. 
Where yi is equal to the dependent variable for the outcome equation; y2 is the 
dependent variable for the selection equation; XJI is the vector of explanatory variables for 
the outcome equation; xi2 is the vector of explanatory variables for the selection equation; 
ßi is the vector of coefficients for the outcome equation; ß2 is the vector of coefficients 
for the selection equation; 8i is the error term for the outcome equation; e2 is the error 
term for the selection equation. 
Tables XIV and XV present the results of the bivariate probit with sample 
selection models. Model 10 uses MASTERS as a single explanatory variable for graduate 
education whereas Model 11 distinguishes between graduate education from NPS and 
sources other than NPS (NOT_NPS). 
The results of Model 10 indicate that graduate education from any source is 
positively related to the joint probability of survival to the 0-5 promotion point and 
promotion to 0-5. The marginal effect of graduate education from any source on survival 
to the 0-5 promotion point is -.0247 and its marginal effect on promotion for those who 
survived is .1597. The sum of these effects is the overall marginal effect on the joint 
probability of survival and promotion. When all variables are held at their means, the 
expected probability of promotion given that an officer survived to the 0-5 promotion 
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Model 10 
Index for SELECT Equation Index for SURVIVE Equation 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 
INTERCEPT -21.5638** 7.4833 • INTERCEPT -36.3745** 1.1007 
PINDEX 2.5978** 0.8099 PINDEX 3.9253** 0.1172 
AWARDS 0.0990** 0.0162 GPA 0.0010 0.0068 





0.1944 COMBAT 0.5084** 0.0504 
COMBAT -0.0315 0.1214 PRIENL -0.3629** 0.0879 
USNA -0.0880 0.1221 USNA -0.1856* 0.0760 
NROTC -0.1197 0.1007 NROTC 0.0008 0.0660 
SERVICE 0.0065 0.1503 SERVICE -0.2195* 0.0880 
SUPPORT -0.0009 0.1045 SUPPORT 0.1281 0.0659 
AVIATOR 0.4672** 0.1045 AVIATOR 0.2121** 0.0700 
AVSPPT 0.3836* 0.1524 AVSPPT 0.0504 0.1027 
COMM AGE -0.0763** 0.0217 COMM AGE -0.0159 0.0148 
MARSTAT 0.0705 0.2445 MARSTAT 0.5777** 0.0948 
DEPEND 0.0258 0.0395 DEPEND 0.1734** 0.0149 
SEX -0.6305** 0.2192 SEX -0.3280** 0.1168 
U RATE 0.2784** 0.0715 
N 1627 N 6507 
RHO 0.0964 0.3042 
EfYl|Y2=H 0.7589 
** significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Table XIV.    Bivariate Probit Model with Sample Selection for the Joint 
Probability of SURVIVE and SELECT (MASTERS). 
point is .7589. Thus, an officer with a graduate degree from any source is 13.5 percentage 
points (or 18 percent) more likely to survive and be promoted to 0-5 than an officer 
without a graduate degree. Note this marginal effect of 13.5 percentage points is very 
close to the marginal effect from the simple probit model for promotion (15.0 percentage 
points). The measure of correlation between the error terms on both models (rho) is 
positive but not statistically significant. 
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The results of Model 11 indicate that graduate education from both NPS and non- 
NPS sources are positively related to the joint probability of retention to the 0-5 
promotion point and promotion to 0-5. The marginal effects indicate that an officer with 
a graduate degree from NPS is 8 percentage points (or 10.9 percent) more likely to 
remain on active duty until the 0-5 promotion point and be promoted than an officer 
without a graduate degree. An officer with a non-NPS graduate degree is 13.5 percentage 
points (or 17 percent) more likely to both remain on active duty until the 0-5 promotion 
point and be promoted than an officer without a graduate degree. The rho term in this 
model is positive but not statistically significant. 
2. Sample Selection Adjustment Using the Heckman Model 
Another technique used for controlling selection bias is the Heckman Procedure. 
It is considered more robust than the bivariate probit model for detecting the presence of 
selection bias, but it uses linear OLS models to estimate the probability of a binary 
outcome. Thus, the magnitude of estimated coefficients may be inconsistent and cannot 
be used for further analysis. In his 1996 NPS thesis, Ronald Wielsma used the Heckman 
Procedure to correct for selection bias in his analysis of the effects of graduate education 
on promotion to 0-4. As Wielsma attempted to control for the retention issue in his 
promotion model, he found that the effect of graduate education decreased when he 
applied this two-stage model. 
The general model for the Heckman Procedure is presented as follows (Green 
1995, 638): 
E[yi|Xi, in sample] = ß'xj + (paE)X,i (3) 
ß'xj + QXi. (4) 
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Where y equals the dependent variable for the outcome equation; x is equal the vector of 
explanatory variables in the selection equation, ß' is the vector of coefficients in the 
selection equation and X is equal to the probability that an observation was selected into 
the sample. 
Modelll 
Index for SELECT Equation Index for SURVIVE Ec uation 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 
INTERCEPT -22.7598** 7.5363 INTERCEPT -36.5148** 1.1020 
PINDEX 2.7296** 0.8130 PINDEX 3.9399** 0.1175 
AWARDS 0.0979 0.0164 GPA 0.0014 0.0068 










0.2076 COMBAT 0.5025** 0.0506 
COMBAT -0.0244 0.1242 PRIENL -0.3562** 0.0883 
USNA -0.0644 0.1230 USNA -0.1739* 0.0764 
NROTC -0.1096 0.1006 NROTC 0.0035 0.0660 
SERVICE 0.0113 0.1514 SERVICE -0.2185* 0.0878 
SUPPORT 0.0157 0.1058 SUPPORT 0.1359* 0.0660 
AVIATOR 0.4703** 0.1038 AVIATOR 0.2115** 0.0701 
AVSPPT 0.3907* 0.1523 AVSPPT 0.0569 0.1037 
COMM AGE -0.0778** 0.0216 COMM AGE -0.0166 0.0148 
MARSTAT 0.0829 0.2458 MARSTAT 0.5780** 0.0947 
DEPEND 0.0285 0.0406 DEPEND 0.1743** 0.0149 
SEX -0.6423** 0.2168 SEX -0.3210** 0.1165 
U RATE 0.2736** 0.0716 
N 1627 N 6507 
RHO 0.1455 0.3124 
ME ErYl|Y2=ll 0.7771 
** significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Marginal Effect in brackets 
Table XV.      Bivariate Probit Model with Sample Selection for the Joint 
Probability of SURVIVE and SELECT (NPS, NOT_NPS). 
The first stage of the Heckman procedure requires a simple probit model to 
estimate the probability of survival to the 0-5 promotion point (Model 1). Heckman 
refers to the term X as "the inverse of Mill's ratio" and describes it as "a monotone 
decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into the sample 
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(Heckman 1979, 156)." The estimation of SURVIVE in the first stage is based on the 
6,507 observations from the Accession Cohort Sample. The output from this first stage 
includes X, which is subsequently used as an explanatory variable in the OLS outcome 
equation. 
This thesis uses Model 5 as the structural model for this second stage outcome 
model. Estimation of the second stage outcome model is based on the 1,627 observations 
of the Promotion Sample. This procedure also requires an instrumental variable in the 
selection equation that is related to retention to the 0-5 promotion point but not related to 
selection for promotion. In this case the instrumental variable is U_RATE. (Heckman, 
1979) 
Table XVI presents the LPM results of two alternative Heckman Models for 
sample selection. Model 12 includes MASTERS as the graduate education variable and 
Model 13 includes NPS and NOT_NPS as explanatory variables to distinguish between 
the effects of graduate education from NPS and sources other than NPS. 
The results of Model 12 indicate that the effect of graduate education from any 
source on selection for promotion to 0-5 remains positive and statistically significant. 
The coefficient of lambda is also positive and significant at the .05 level. This indicates 
that some bias did exist on the estimates produced in Model 5. While the LPM estimates 
produced in Model 12 are only a linear approximation of the non-linear probit function, it 
appears that the marginal effect of MASTERS increased from .1504 in Model 5 to .2295. 
Consistent with previous research, one would have expected the marginal effect to 
decrease. All of the statistically significant explanatory variables from Model 12 match 
the significant variables in Model 5. 
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Model 12 Model 13 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 
INTERCEPT -10.3676** 2.2394 -10.4704** 2.2535 
PINDEX 1.2630** 0.2433 1.2748** 0.2448 
AWARDS 0.0259** 0.0045 0.0255** 0.0045 
PME 0.2291** 0.0221 0.2246** 0.0224 
MASTERS 0.2295** 0.0556 
NPS 0.1901** 0.0574 
NOT NPS 0.2434** 0.0579 
COMBAT 0.0325 0.0337 0.0309 0.0335 
USNA -0.0358 0.0365 -0.0286 0.0366 
NROTC -0.0386 0.0298 -0.0368 0.0298 
SERVICE -0.0146 0.0473 -0.0113 0.0473 
SUPPORT 0.0072 0.0306 0.0107 0.0308 
AVIATOR 0.1428** 0.0295 0.1418** 0.0295 
AVSPPT 0.1165** 0.0444 0.1201** 0.0445 
COMM AGE -0.0268** 0.0065 -0.0270** 0.0065 
MARSTAT 0.0836 0.0701 0.0843 0.0702 
DEPEND 0.0203 0.0115 0.0208 0.0116 
SEX -0.2190** 0.0669 -0.2158** 0.0668 
LAMBDA 0.1738* 0.0877 0.1756* 0.0879 
N Data Set 6507 6507 
N Selected 1627 1627 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Table XVI.    Two-Step Heckman Model Adjustment for Sample Selection: LPM 
Estimates for SELECT. 
The results of Model 13 indicate that the effects of both NPS and non-NPS 
graduate education on selection for promotion to 0-5 remain positive and statistically 
significant. Like Model 12, the coefficient of lambda is positive and significant at the .05 
level, and the marginal effects of NPS and NOTJNPS are larger than those found in 
Model 6. The sign and significance of all coefficients are consistent with those of Model 
6. 
D.       MODELING FOR SELF SELECTION BIAS 
Officers who hold graduate degrees were not randomly selected into graduate 
education programs; they voluntarily chose to participate and in some cases were 
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accepted by the Marine Corps to undertake graduate education. Thus, they are likely to 
possess characteristics, unobserved in Model 5, that are correlated with both possession 
of graduate education and promotion to 0-5. These officers would surely have had a 
higher probability of being promoted to 0-5 regardless of whether or not they obtained 
graduate degrees. Hence, the estimates in Models 5 and 6 are potentially affected by 
selection bias. 
1.        Modeling for Graduate Education 
Both of the techniques used for correcting potential self-selection bias require 
simple probit estimates for the probability of selection to graduate education. Table XVII 
presents the results of two simple probit models using the binary dependent variable 
MASTERS. The simple probit models for selection to graduate education are all based 
on the Promotion Sample. 
The results of model 15 indicate that officers with higher GCT scores, higher 
GPAs at TBS, from the Naval Academy and those who have been married are more 
likely to undertake graduate education. The results also indicate that aviators are less 
likely to hold graduate degrees than officers from ground combat arms MOSs. These 
results are consistent with previous expectations and indicate a reasonable goodness of 
fit. Additionally, the log likelihood statistic indicates that the set of explanatory variables 
jointly are significant in explaining the probability of possessing a graduate degree. This 
model correctly predicts 59.7 percent of the observations. 
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Variable Model 14 
Model 15 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 









USNA 0.4194** 0.1051 0.3632** 0.1077 
NROTC 0.1111 0.0889 0.0799 0.0900 
SERVICE 0.2690 0.1380 0.2482 0.1385 
SUPPORT 0.1470 0.0907 0.1399 0.0909 
AVIATOR -0.3029** 0.0852 -0.3254** 0.0857 
AVSPPT 0.1876 0.1332 0.1822 0.1334 
COMM AGE -0.0093 0.0187 -0.0070 0.0187 
MARSTAT 0.4022* 0.1848 0.3925* 0.1849 
DEPEND -0.0147 0.0243 -0.0154 0.0244 
SEX -0.0597 0.1924 -0.0643 0.1931 
N 1627 1627 
-2Log L 2163.97 2158.038 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Marginal Effect in brackets 
Table XVII.   Simple Probit Models for MASTERS. 
Models 16 and 17 in Table XVIII present results of simple probit models for the 
binary dependent variables NPS and NOTJNPS, respectively. These models use the 
same set of explanatory variables as Model 15. 
The results of model 16 indicate that officers with higher GCT scores and Naval 
Academy graduates are all more likely to hold NPS graduate degrees. The results also 
indicate that officers from SERVICE, SUPPORT and AVSPPT MOS categories are more 
likely to hold NPS degrees than ground combat arms officers, whereas aviators are less 
likely to hold NPS degrees. These results are consistent with previous expectations, and 
this model predicts with 87 percent accuracy. 
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The results of Model 17 indicate that officers with higher GPAs at TBS and those 
who have been married are more likely to hold graduate degrees from sources other than 
NPS. The results also indicate that aviators are less likely to hold non-NPS graduate 
degrees than those in combat arms MOSs. This model predicts actual observations with 
only 60.8 percent accuracy. Thus, overall goodness of fit for this model is considered 
marginal. 
A possible explanation for the difference in the coefficients for GPA and GCT 
between Models 16 and 17 is that selection for NPS is largely based on academic 
qualification whereas selection for non-NPS programs is based on self selection in the 
case of the Tuition Assistance Program and military performance in the case of 
intermediate-level PME institutions. Thus, one might expect GCT to be more positive 
and significant in the NPS model and GPA at TBS to be more positive and significant in 
the NOT_NPS model. 
2.        Bivariate Probit 
Bowman and Mehay (1999) used the bivariate probit model to address the issue 
of selection bias caused by the non-random selection of officers into graduate education 
programs. They decribed the model as follows (Bowman and Mehay 1999,458): 
Y| = Xtß + lGff+6yl (5) 
Gi = ZiOl + 6Gi (6) 
Where Igi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual attends graduate 
school and equal to 0 otherwise; yj is the latent value of being promoted; Gi is the 
latent value of completing graduate school; Xj is a set of individual characteristics and 
Zi includes some of the characteristics in x plus a set of instruments for graduate 
school completion. 
74 
Model 16 Model 17 
Variable Dependent Variable = NPS Dependent Variable = NOT NPS 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 











USNA 0.7933** 0.1226 -0.1141 0.1072 
NROTC 0.2095 0.1162 -0.0113 0.0877 
SERVICE 0.5956** 0.1607 -0.0981 0.1356 
SUPPORT 0.4888** 0.1183 -0.1158 0.0940 
AVIATOR -0.3508** 0.1295 -0.2023* 0.0858 
AVSPPT 0.5094** 0.1620 -0.0809 0.1319 
COMM AGE -0.0029 0.0252 -0.0030 0.0186 
MARSTAT 0.0745 0.2663 0.3751* 0.1896 
DEPEND 0.0273 0.0319 -0.0275 0.0245 
SEX 0.2514 0.2431 -0.2223 0.1890 
N 1627 1627 
2LogL 1103.904 2162.834 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Marginal Effect in brackets 
Table XVIII. Simple Probit Models for NPS and NOT_NPS. 
Table XIX presents the results of the bivariate probit estimates in which 
MASTERS, NPS and NOT_NPS serve as G in Models 18, 19 and 20, respectively, and 
SELECT serves as Y. Models 18, 19 and 20 are all based on the Promotion Sample of 
1,627 observations and use GCT score as an instrumental variable in Z. 
In order to identify GCT score an instrumental variable related to possession of a 
graduate degree but not related to promotion, the following null hypotheses required 
testing: 
• An officer's GCT score is not a significant determinant of promotion to O- 
5. 
• GCT score is not a significant determinant of the decision to pursue 
graduate education. 
Models 5 and 9 both estimate the probability of promotion to 0-5; however, 
Model 9 includes the variable GCT to test the first null hypothesis. Model 5 serves as the 
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Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Variable Index for SELECT Index for SELECT Index for SELECT 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. StdErr. Coeff. StdErr. 
INTERCEPT -18.7468** 2.6888 -19.5599** 2.3605 -16.2136** 3.1413 
PINDEX 2.2328** 0.3175 2.3739** 0.2633 1.9153** 0.3732 
AWARDS 0.0888** 0.0166 0.0904** 0.0154 0.0745** 0.0165 














COMBAT -0.0485 0.0713 -0.0621 0.0731 -0.0484 0.0627 
USNA -0.2035 0.1211 -0.3087* 0.1392 0.0299 0.1062 
NROTC -0.1516 0.0958 -0.1691 0.0980 -0.0833 0.0905 
SERVICE -0.0503 0.1387 -0.1256 0.1442 0.0855 0.1275 
SUPPORT -0.0260 0.0974 -0.0995 0.1029 0.0837 0.0918 
AVIATOR 0.5368** 0.0959 0.4931** 0.0979 0.4689** 0.0979 
AVSPPT 0.2941 0.1529 0.2388 0.1547 0.3515* 0.1383 
COMM AGE -0.0659** 0.0200 -0.0664** 0.0199 -0.0595** 0.0196 
MARSTAT -0.1057 0.2069 0.0111 0.2065 -0.1462 0.1930 
DEPEND 0.0166 0.0249 0.0056 0.0257 0.0248    . 0.0238 
SEX -0.5579** 0.1989 -0.6533** 0.2061 -0.3890** 0.1936 
Index for MASTERS Index for NPS Index for NOT_NPS 
INTERCEPT -4.9208** 0.9308 -7.0737** 1.2485 -2.9864** 0.8899 
GPA 0.0460** 0.0099 0.0303* 0.0142 0.0385** 0.0097 
GCT 0.0066 0.0035 0.0199** 0.0046 -0.0032 0.0032 
USNA 0.3745** 0.1083 0.8049** 0.1235 -0.1299 0.1076 
NROTC 0.0860 0.0909 0.1930 0.1174 -0.0106 0.0902 
SERVICE 0.2646 0.1422 0.6203** 0.1546 -0.1158 0.1364 
SUPPORT 0.1441 0.0912 0.5153** 0.1173 -0.1037 0.0908 
AVIATOR -0.3195** 0.0855 -0.3257* 0.1402 -0.1970** 0.0863 
AVSPPT 0.1823 0.1345 0.5545** 0.1611 -0.0898 0.1341 
COMM AGE -0.0088 0.0190 -0.0047 0.0252 -0.0059 0.0185 
MARSTAT 0.3936* 0.1862 0.0655 0.2637 0.3713 0.1947 
DEPEND -0.0151 0.0245 0.0328 0.0311 -0.0264 0.0249 
SEX -0.0771 0.1896 0.2431 0.2338 -0.2763 0.1858 
RHO -0.5801** 0.2204 -0.6525** 0.1733 -0.8029** 0.1776 
N 1627 1627 1627 
E[yl|y2=n 0.5392 0.227 0.3411 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Marginal Effect in brackets 
Table XIX.    Bivariate Probit Models for SELECT/MASTERS, NPS,NOT_NPS. 
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restricted model and model 9 serves as the unrestricted model. The LLR test yields a chi- 
square statistic (X.) of .19. At the 95 percent confidence level, the critical test statistic is 
3.84(chi-square, 1 df). Thus, the first null hypothesis is accepted. 
Models 14 and 15 both estimate the probability of selection to graduate education; 
however, Model 15 includes the variable GCT score whereas Model 14 does not. In order 
to test the second hypothesis, Model 14 serves as the restricted model and Model 15 as 
the unrestricted model. GCT score is statistically significant in Model 15 and the chi- 
square statistic for the LLR test is 5.93. At the 95 percent confidence level, the critical 
test statistic is 3.84 (Chi-square, 1 df). The second null hypothesis is rejected: GCT score 
is an important determinant of the decision to pursue graduate education. Thus, GCT 
score is identified as an acceptable instrumental variable. 
The results of Model 18 indicate that graduate education from any source remains 
positively related to promotion to 0-5. The sign and significance of the variables 
PINDEX, AWARDS, PME, MASTERS, AVIATOR, COMM_AGE and SEX are 
consistent with the signs and significance levels of same variables presented in Model 5; 
however, the marginal effect of MASTERS increased from .15 in Model 5 to .584 in 
Model 18. An officer with a graduate degree from any source is 58 percentage points (or 
108 percent) more likely to be selected for promotion than an officer without graduate 
education. 
The rho term in Model 18 is negative and statistically significant which indicates 
that the estimates of the simple probit in Model 5 were biased downward. This negative 
rho term indicates that the unobserved factors that predict both graduate education and 
selection for promotion are negatively correlated. This outcome is inconsistent with 
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Bowman and Mehay's (1999) results, which indicated an upward bias on the graduate 
education variable in their simple probit model. Additionally, the magnitude of the 
change in the marginal effect of MASTERS from Model 5 to Model 18 seems infeasible. 
Thus, the results of the entire model should be considered cautiously. 
The results of Model 19 indicate that graduate education from both NPS and 
sources other than NPS is positively related to promotion to 0-5 and statistically 
significant. The marginal effect of NPS increases from .1065 in Model 6 to .5328 in 
Model 19. This produces the implausible result that an officer with a graduate degree 
from NPS is 234 percent more likely to be promoted to 0-5 than an officer without a 
graduate degree. The rho term in Model 19 is negative and statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the change in marginal effect from Model 6 to Model 19 should cause 
suspicion and such results should be used with caution. 
With NOT_NPS as G the results of Model 20 indicate that non-NPS graduate 
education is positively related to selection for promotion to 0-5 and statistically 
significant. The marginal effect of non-NPS graduate education increases from .167 in 
Model 6 to .8347 in Model 20. Thus, an officer with non-NPS graduate education is 245 
percent more likely to be promoted to 0-5 than an officer without graduate education. 
The rho term is again negative and statistically significant. As with the results of Models 
18 and 19, the results of Model 20 should also be used with considerable caution since 
the magnitude of the marginal effect falls outside the realm of plausibility. 
3.        The Heckman Procedure 
In his 1996 NPS thesis, Weilsma also used the Heckman Procedure to control for 
selection bias that potentially affected his simple probit estimate of the effect of graduate 
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education on promotion to the rank of 0-4 in the Marine Corps. Wielsma found that use 
of the Heckman Procedure actually reduced the effect of graduate education from that 
found with his simple probit estimate (as did Bowman and Mehay). 
This thesis uses Models 15, 16 and 17 as the first stage selection equations, which 
predict the likelihood that an officer has a graduate degree from any source, from NPS or 
from a source other than NPS, respectively. As with the Heckman Procedure for sample 
selection bias presented earlier, the output of these first stage models includes X, which 
will be used as an explanatory variable in second stage promotion models. The second 
stage models use OLS (linear probability model) to estimate the probability of promotion 
to 0-5, and their results are presented in Table XX. 
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
Variable 
Adjusted for MASTERS Adjusted for NPS Adjusted for NOT NPS 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. StdErr. 
INTERCEPT -6.1167** 0.8509 -6.1534** 0.8513 -6.2272** 0.8670 
PINDEX 0.7878** 0.0956 0.8084** 0.0952 0.7758** 0.0951 
AWARDS 0.0255** 0.0045 0.0255** 0.0045 0.0241** 0.0045 
PME 0.2313** 0.0222 0.2294** 0.0225 0.2256** 0.0227 
MASTERS 0.5052** 0.1649   
NPS 0.5167** 0.1701 0.0927** 0.0355 
NOT NPS 0.1340** 0.0235 1.0958** 0.4218 
COMBAT -0.0131 0.0229 -0.0181 0.0230 -0.0136 0.0228 
USNA -0.0748 0.0457 -0.0946 0.0500 0.0366 0.0546 
NROTC -0.0578 0.0335 -0.0567 0.0321 -0.0363 0.0436 
SERVICE -0.0213 0.0508 -0.0435 0.0523 0.0619 0.0705 
SUPPORT -0.0137 0.0324 -0.0390 0.0344 0.0590 0.0517 
AVIATOR 0.1789** 0.0375 0.1465** 0.0304 0.2117** 0.0561 
AVSPPT 0.0902 0.0483 0.0729 0.0485 0.1541* 0.0675 
COMM AGE -0.0233** 0.0066 -0.0226** 0.0063 -0.0250** 0.0091 
MARSTAT -0.0526 0.0710 0.0010 0.0630 -0.1273 0.1085 
DEPEND 0.0070 0.0088 0.0025 0.0084 0.0155 0.0129 
SEX -0.1759* 0.0687 -0.2052** 0.0671 -0.1001 0.0998 
LAMBDA -0.2373* 0.1027 -0.2343* 0.0931 -0.5962* 0.2614 
N 1627 1627 1627 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Table XX.      Selection Adjusted Heckman Models: 
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LPM Estimates for SELECT. 
Model 21 uses MASTERS as the binary dependent variable for the first stage 
selection model. The results of Model 21 indicate that graduate education from any 
source is positively related to selection for promotion to 0-5 and is statistically 
significant. With the exception of AVSPPT, all significant variables from Model 5 
retained their sign and level of significance in Model 21. Because this second stage LPM 
model for promotion is a linear approximation of the non-linear probit model, one can 
roughly compare the coefficients in Model 21 to the marginal effects in Model 18. The 
size of the coefficient (.505) is fairly consistent with the marginal effect from Model 18 
(.583), which again is implausibly large. The lambda term is negative and significant at 
the .05 level, which indicates the existence of a downward bias on the effect of 
MASTERS in Model 5. 
Model 22 uses NPS as the binary dependent variable in the first stage selection 
model. The results of Model 22 indicate that graduate education from NPS is positively 
related to promotion to 0-5. With the exception of AVSPPT, all significant variables are 
consistent with those found in Model 6. As with Model 21, the lambda term is negative 
and significant at the .05 level, an indication of a downward bias on the NPS coefficient 
in Model 6. The size of the coefficient for NPS is again too large to be plausible. 
Model 23 uses NOT_NPS as the binary dependent variable in the first stage 
selection model. The results of Model 23 indicate that non-NPS graduate education is 
positively related to promotion to 0-5. All significant variables are consistent with the 
sign and significance of those found in Model 6. As with Models 21 and 22, the lambda 
term is negative and significant at the .05 level, an indication of a downward bias on the 
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NOT_NPS coefficient in Model 6. Similar to Models 21 and 22, the coefficient for 
NOT_NPS is too large to be plausible. 
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VI.    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.       SUMMARY 
The results of simple probit models for both retention to the 0-5 promotion point 
and selection for 0-5 indicate that the effects of graduate education from any source 
(MASTERS), graduate education from NPS and graduate education from sources other 
than NPS (NOT_NPS) are all positively related to both retention and promotion to 0-5. 
The results also indicate that graduate education from non-NPS institutions has a 
greater positive effect on both retention and promotion than graduate education from 
NPS. Although completion of resident or non-resident intermediate-level PME was 
included as an explanatory variable in the promotion models, the fact that the NOT_NPS 
variable reflects graduate education from intermediate-level PME institutions could still 
explain why the impact of the non-NPS graduate degree variable is so large. 
While indicating positive returns on graduate education from all categories, the 
results of bivariate probit models with sample selection (due to stay-leave decisions) 
produced implausibly large coefficients on the graduate education variables. This could 
indicate that the bivariate probit system was not correctly specified. Thus, the selection- 
adapted results should be used with caution. 
The Heckman models to adjust for sample selection indicated that an upward bias 
did exist on the coefficients of the graduate education variables in the simple probit 
estimates for promotion; however, the effects of graduate education from all three 
categories remained positive and statistically significant. 
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While indicating positive returns on graduate education from all three categories, 
the size of the estimated coefficients for the graduate degree variables in the bivariate 
probit models for promotion to 0-5 and selection for graduate education seem 
implausible and should be considered with caution. A possible explanation for these 
inconclusive results is that the first-stage simple probit estimates for the likelihood of 
holding a graduate degree were poorly specified to begin with and thus provided poor 
predictive power. Identification relies on the use of instrumental variables in the selection 
equation that can be safely omitted from the outcome equation. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to identify and obtain data on factors that predict graduate education that are also 
not related to retention or promotion. 
The results of the Heckman models for promotion and selection to graduate 
education indicate that the effects of graduate education from all three categories are 
positively related to promotion to 0-5 and statistically significant. Their negative and 
significant lambda terms indicate that a downward bias did exist on the effects of 
graduate education in the simple probit estimates for graduate education. 
Table XXI presents the marginal effects for the three graduate education 
categories on retention and promotion to 0-5 based on the results of the simple probit 
models. In the absence of more complete data to address potential selection bias, the 
marginal effects presented in Table XXI should be considered the most likely estimates. 
ANY MASTERS NPS NOT NPS 
SURVIVE .120 .106 .125 
SELECT .150 .107 .167 
Table XXI.    Marginal Effects of Graduate Education on SURVIVE and SELECT. 
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B.       CONCLUSIONS 
Positive returns on graduate education are indicative of a "win-win" outcome for 
both the individual officer and the Marine Corps. The career-minded officer who chooses 
to participate in the Marine Corps' graduate education programs can look forward to a 
long, secure career and anticipate a greater chance of promotion to 0-5. The Marine 
Corps can expect a longer period over which it can recoup its investment in the officer, 
and receives officers from the graduate education programs who are more productive. 
Thus, the individual career-minded officer has an incentive to participate and the Marine 
Corps has an incentive to support its graduate education programs. 
The results of this thesis should help alleviate perceptions that graduate education 
programs are only beneficial to officers considering employment outside the Marine 
Corps. The results should also alleviate perceptions that participation in graduate 
education programs will hurt an officer's prospects for promotion to higher ranks. 
The results of the bivariate probit models for self selection for graduate education 
and the Heckman Models indicate that the unobserved factors, which predict both 
graduate education and promotion to 0-5 are negatively related. In addition to factors 
such as time spent in the Fleet Marine Force, time spent in an officer's primary MOS and 
unobserved performance evaluations, these factors might include subjective qualities 
such as work ethic, absolute loyalty to the Marine Corps, leadership ability, propensity 
for academics and taste for the military. These subjective qualities could possibly 
contribute to any negative perceptions that currently exist regarding the Marine Corps' 
graduate education programs. 
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While negative perceptions of the Marine Corps' graduate education programs 
appear to be false, they still pose a danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. If 
individual officers base their decisions to participate on these false perceptions, the 
Marine Corps will naturally end up with a pool of less select officers who choose to 
pursue graduate degrees and in time, empirical research will indicate that the effects of 
graduate education are indeed negative. 
C.       LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitations of this thesis are a result of insufficient data. The 
inclusion of graduate education from PME institutions in the NOT_NPS category could 
be a dominant factor in results that indicate non-NPS graduate education has a greater 
positive effect on both retention and promotion than graduate education from NPS. Data 
to support an additional category for graduate education from PME institutions could 
validate this notion. Nevertheless, these findings should not be used for policy decisions 
regarding the relative efficiency of NPS versus non-NPS graduate education. 
Bivariate Probit models for sample selection were not adequately specified. 
Additional instrumental variables that are related to retention but not related to promotion 
could improve model specification and provide more accurate estimates of the effect of 
graduate education on retention of Marine officers. 
The bivariate Probit results for self-selection are considered infeasible since the 
magnitude of the effects of graduate education on promotion becomes so large. Data 
elements that better predict whether an officer possesses a graduate degree while 
unrelated to promotion would likely correct this problem. 
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D.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two primary recommendations result from this thesis. The first is that the 
following data elements be collected for more thorough analysis of the effect of graduate 
education on retention and promotion of Marine Officers: 
Graduate education from the intermediate-level PME institutions 
The amount of time spent in the Fleet Marine Force over the course of a 
career 
The amount of time spent in an officer's primary MOS over the course of 
a career 
Undergraduate GPA 
Data  on subsequent promotion boards  and corresponding accession 
cohorts 
The second recommendation is that the Marine Corps should continue to 
emphasize the value and importance of its graduate education programs. Perceptions 
based on fact or fiction tend to affect decisions made at the individual level. The Marine 
Corps' continued emphasis on these programs will contribute to their effectiveness and 
the combat readiness of the Marine Corps well into the future. 
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APPENDIX A. MARINE CORPS FITNESS REPORT 
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